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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law. The Review was
written by Donald Campbell and Rosalie Martinelli as a special project
for the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -REVOCATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
Baillie v. Moore
In Baillie v. Moore , Baillie appealed from a district court judgment
upholding the administrative revocation of his driver's license for
refusing to take an intoxilyzer test.2 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the revocation, reasoning that a driver's statement that he or she
will not take an intoxilyzer test without having an attorney present does
not constitute a "refusal" under Chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota
Century Code, rather it constitutes a request to speak with an attorney.3
Baillie, appellant, was arrested for driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor and transported to the police station.4 After arriving
at the police station, the arresting officer conducted additional sobriety
tests and then asked Baillie to take an intoxilyzer test. 5 Baillie responded
that he would not take an intoxilyzer examination without the presence
of an attorney. 6 The arresting officer deemed Baillie's response as
constituting a refusal, and no intoxilyzer test was administered. 7 Subse-
quently, Baillie's driver's license was revoked by the Department of
Transportation for refusing to submit to an intoxilyzer examination,
pursuant to sections 39-20-04 and 39-20-05 of the North Dakota
Century Code.8 Baillie appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
revocation, and then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 9
On appeal, Baillie's primary contention was that he was denied a
reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney before deciding
whether to submit to an intoxilyzer test. 10 Baillie therefore asserts that
his failure to take the test does not constitute a refusal upon which his
driver's license may be revoked.l 1 The Department claimed that
Baillie's statement that he would not take the test without the presence of
an attorney was a refusal to take the test, and not a request to consult an
attorney, thereby warranting license revocation. 12 The North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that adopting the Department's argument
1. 522 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1994).
2. Baillie v. Moore, 522 N.W.2d 748,749 (N.D. 1994).
3. Id. at 750-51.
4. Id. at 749.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Baillie, 522 N.W.2d at 749.
8. Id. N.D. CEr. CODE §§ 32-20-04, -05 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
9. Baillie, 522 N.W.2d at 749.




would result in an "unduly restrictive interpretation" of Baillie's
response.13 The court held that anytime a DUI arrestee responds with an
affirmative mention of the need for an attorney, law enforcement offi-
cers must assume that the arrestee is requesting to consult with an attor-
ney.' 4 Under these circumstances, failure by law enforcement to allow
an arrestee a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney will
prevent the revocation of the arrestee's driver's license for refusing to
take a chemical test. 15
Accordingly, the district court's judgment was reversed. 16
Olson v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp. Director
In Olson v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp. Director,17 Olson
appealed from a district court judgment affirming a Department of
Transportation decision to revoke his driver's license for refusing to
submit to a blood-alcohol test. 18 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the license revocation, reasoning that a juvenile's failure to
submit to a chemical test cannot be treated as a "refusal" for purposes
of license suspension when the juvenile's parent was not read the implied
consent advisory.19
Olson, appellant, a minor, was stopped and arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. 20 In accordance with section 39-20-01
of the North Dakota Century Code, one of the arresting deputies asked
his department's dispatcher to contact Olson's parents, while the other
deputy drove to the parents' residence to attempt to contact them.2 1
However, both attempts to contact Olson's parents were unsuccessful. 22
Olson was taken to a hospital to undergo a blood-alcohol test, but the
administering nurse refused to give Olson the test without parental
consent.2 3 The nurse then telephoned Olson's parents and made contact
with his mother.2 4 The arresting deputy informed Olson's mother that
he had her son in custody and that her son had been driving under the
13. Id.
14. Baillie, 522 N.W.2d at 750. The court intended its holding to set forth a "bright line" test for
determining if an arrestee must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney when
deciding whether to submit to a chemical test. Id.
15. Id. The court concluded that Baillie was not allowed a reasonable opportunity to exercise his
right to consult with an attorney. Id.
16. Id.
17. 523 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1994).
18. Olson v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp. Director, 523 N.W.2d 258, 259 (N.D. 1994).
19. Id. at 261.
20. Id. at 259.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Olson, 523 N.W.2d at 259.
24. Id.
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influence of alcohol.25 The deputy did not read the implied consent
advisory to Olson's mother, nor did he permit Olson to speak with his
mother.2 6 Following the telephone conversation, the deputy asked Olson
if he would take a blood-alcohol test, and Olson asked what would
happen if he refused.27 The deputy then reread the implied consent
advisory to Olson, and Olson refused to take the test.28 Subsequently,
the North Dakota Department of Transportation revoked Olson's license,
pursuant to section 39-20-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, and
this decision was upheld by the district court.2 9
On appeal, Olson's primary contention was that the arresting
deputy's failure to read the implied consent advisory to his mother
vitiates his refusal to take a blood-alcohol test. 30 The North Dakota
Supreme Court agreed with Olson and found that section 39-20-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code requires police officers to read the
implied consent advisory to the parents of minors arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. 31 The court reasoned that the two-fold
purpose for contacting parents under section 39-20-01 is to explain the
cause of custody and the implied consent requirements. 32 The court
discussed the parents' role in such situations as providing direction and
guidance to the minor in making his or her decision. 33 The court
bolstered their reasoning by noting that minors are recognized members
of a special class of citizens who may require additional legal protection,
such as in circumstances like the present case.34 Thus, the court held that
a juvenile's failure to submit to a chemical test cannot be treated as a
"refusal" for purposes of license suspension if the directives of section
39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code are not met, i.e. the juve-
nile's parents are not contacted or are not read the implied consent




28. Olson, 523 N.W.2d at 259. After refusing to take the test, Olson was transported to the
sheriffs department. Id. At the Sheriffs department, Olson was advised by an attorney to submit to a
urine test. Id. Olson requested that such a test be given, but the arresting deputy refused to administer




32. Id. at 260.
33. Olson, 523 N.W.2d at 260. Furthermore, the court noted that the legislature has concluded
that in order for parents to fulfill this role, they need to be informed of the specifics of their child's
confinement and of the informed consent advisory. Id.
34. Id. The court noted that a situation involving a child's statutory rights under section 39-20-01
of the North Dakota Century Code has been identified by the legislature as one of those instances
where children need assistance and additional legal protection. Id. at 261.
35. Id. The court also concluded that section 39-20-05(3) of the North Dakota Century Code
[VOL. 71:841
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Chief Justice VandeWalle issued his own opinion, concurring in the
majority's result, to emphasize that the majority's holding did not
conflict with prior decisions or with section 39-20-05(3) of the North
Dakota Century Code. 37
Justice Neumann dissented to indicate that in order to harmonize
sections 39-20-01 and 39-20-05(3) of the North Dakota Century Code
the issue of whether the implied consent advisory was read to a juvenile's
parents should not be considered during an administrative hearing. 38
Surrogate Judge Vernon Pederson also issued a dissenting opinion
to state that the majority's decision, imposing a prerequisite obligation to
contact a minor's parents, creates an absurd situation for law enforce-
ment officials. 39 Judge Pederson proclaimed that the license revocation
should be affirmed.40
CIVIL PROCEDURE-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
BASF Corp. v. Symington
In BASF Corp. v. Symington,4 1 the United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota certified two questions of law regarding
limitation extension statutes to the North Dakota Supreme Court.42 In
response to these questions, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that:
(1) under section 28-01-16(5) of the North Dakota Century Code, a
claim for relief accrues when a reasonable person, not suffering from
disabilities, would have been cognizant of the facts placing a reasonable
person on notice that a potential claim exists; and (2) in applying the
"discovery rule," for purposes of determining when a claim for relief
does not preclude administrative consideration of whether a juvenile has made an effective refusal to
chemical testing, despite the absence of parental guidance. Id.
36. Id. at 261.
37. Id. at 261-62 (VandeWalle, CJ., concurring). N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-05(3) (1987 &
Supp. 1993).
38. Olson, 523 N.W.2d at 263 (Neumann, J., dissenting). Justice Neumann stated that he would
have affirmed the license revocation. Id.
39. Id. at 263-64 (Pederson, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 264.
41. 512 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1994).
42. BASF Corp. v. Symington, 512 N.W.2d 692, 693-94 (N.D. 1994). The certified questions
were specifically stated as follows:
1. Does the State of North Dakota's statutory time for commencement of action
limitation and its judicial application of the "discovery rule" operate to time-bar the
cause of action of an incompetent plaintiff who, since shortly after birth 26 years ago,
suffered and continues to suffer, from a severe mental disability which appears to have
been caused by a substance manufactured and marketed by the defendant.
2. Is the knowledge of an incompetent's natural parent and guardian imputed to the
incompetent for the purposes of applying the discovery rule and the relevant statute of
limitation to the incompetent's cause of action.
Id. at 694.
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arises under section 28-01-25 of the North Dakota Century Code,
knowledge of a parent or guardian is not imputed to a minor or to a
mentally incompetent person. 43
The underlying lawsuit revolved around Darlene Symington's,
plaintiff and legal guardian, allegations that her daughter, Darci Sym-
ington, has become permanently mentally retarded as a result of coming
into contact with the chemical Loxene shortly after her birth in 1966.44
Darci Symington became seriously ill shortly after birth, and as she grew
older it became apparent that she was mentally disabled. 45 Darlene
Symington had knowledge, within five years of Darci's birth, that
Darci's retardation may have been caused by exposure to Loxene. 46
However, Darci has never personally been cognizant of the nature or
cause of her disabilities.47
The Symingtons' primary contention in this matter is that section
28-01-25 of the North Dakota Century Code implies a subjective stan-
dard for determining when a disabled claimant's cause of action ac-
crues. 48 Under such a standard, the Symingtons argued that their claim
for relief should not accrue until Darci's disabilities and mental incom-
petency cease to exist, otherwise Darci would not be able to fully under-
stand her legal rights.4 9 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
disagreed by concluding that the Legislature did not intend to allow
claimants with disabilities an unlimited amount of time to file lawsuits. 50
Accordingly, the court held that a claim for relief, under section
28-01-25 of the North Dakota Century Code, accrues when a reasonable
person, not suffering from disabilities, would have been cognizant of the
facts placing a reasonable person on notice that a potential claim exists.51
With respect to the second certified question, regarding the use of
the discovery rule under section 28-01-25 of the North Dakota Century
43. Id. at 696-97. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01-16(5), -25 (1991).
44. Symington, 512 N.W.2d. at 694. Loxene was manufactured by a predecessor of BASF Cor-
poration. Id. The chemical was used in the laundering of diapers and linens by the Pembina
Memorial Hospital in Cavalier, North Dakota, where Darci was born. Id.
45. Id. Darci suffers from permanent severe mental retardation requiring constant care, super-
vision, and institutional care. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 694. The underlying lawsuit was filed in 1991, and Darci is currently 26 years old. Id.
at 700.
48. Id. at 696. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1991).
49. Symington, 512 N.W.2d at 696.
50. Id. at 696-97.
51. Id. at 697. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1991). However, the court declined to answer the
first certified question because its answer rested upon a finding of fact that was not yet determined,
i.e. , when Darci's mother discovered sufficient facts to place her on notice that a potential claim
existed. Symington, 512 N.W.2d at 697.
[VOL. 71:841846
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Code, the court found that a parent or guardian's knowledge is not
imputed to a minor or to a mentally incompetent person. 52
Justice Meschke wrote separately to emphasize that the time limita-
tion for a person with a disability does not simply run from the accrual
or discovery date, as it does for someone without a disability, rather it
begins to run when all of the applicable disability extensions have
expired .53
Accordingly, the certified questions were addressed.54
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n.
In Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n.,55 the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the restriction of soliciting and signing petitions
to booths rented for such purposes did not violate the solicitor's free-
dom of speech nor did it violate North Dakota's constitutional provision
prohibiting laws that constrain people from adopting initiative propos-
als.56 In July 1992, Robert V. Bolinske, as chairman of the sponsoring
committee for a particular initiative, proposed a measure pursuant to
Article III, section 1, of the North Dakota Constitution. 57 If passed, this
initiative would create an environmental and recycling fund in addition
to imposing a fee on the disposal or incineration of waste in the State of
North Dakota. 58 After obtaining approval by the Secretary of State,
Bolinske tried to circulate the petition and collect signatures at the North
Dakota State Fair.59 However, Bolinske was informed by the fair manag-
er that he could not roam the fairgrounds to circulate his petition, and
that he would have to rent a booth if he wanted to solicit signatures for
52. Symington, 512 N.W.2d at 697. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1991).
53. Symington, 512 N.W.2d at 697-98 (Meschke, J., concurring). Justice Meschke indicated that
he would have answered both certified questions in the negative. Id. at 700.
54. Id. at 697.
55. 522 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1994).
56. Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426,434 (N.D. 1994).
57. Id. at 428. Article I, section 1 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that:
While the legislative power of the state shall be vested in a legislative assembly
consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, the people reserve the power to
propose and enact laws by the initiative, including the call for a constitutional convention;
to approve or reject legislative Acts, or parts thereof, by the referendum; to propose and
adopt constitutional amendments by the initiative; and to recall certain elected officials.
This article is self-executing and all of its provisions are mandatory. Laws may be
enacted to facilitate and safeguard, but not to hamper, restrict, or impair these powers.
N.D. CONST. art. III, § I.
58. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 428.
59. Id. The state fair is held annually in Minot, North Dakota, pursuant to section 4-02.1-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-02.1-01 (1987).
19951 847
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
his petition.60 Bolinske refused to apply for a booth, and asserted that
none were available anyway.61
Bolinske then filed a lawsuit against the fair Association seeking to
enjoin the Association from restricting the circulation of his petition at
the State Fair. 62 Bolinske was granted a temporary restraining order
against the fairgrounds which permitted him to solicit signatures for the
initiative petition for the two remaining days of the fair. 63 When the fair
ended, the Association filed a motion to dismiss Bolinske's lawsuit. 64 In
granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court relied on the Association's
presentation of its written regulations and booth space policy.6 5
Bolinske appealed. 66
On appeal, Bolinske argued that the Association's restrictions on
initiative petition soliciting violated his constitutional right of free speech
and his right to initiate laws through the initiative process. 67 The Associa-
tion responded by stating that, in keeping with the statutory purposes
and objectives of the fair, the proper limitations are reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions that are necessary for the safety and
convenience of fair attendees .68
In affirming the lower court's decision, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the Association's regulation, which restricts petition
solicitation, "constitutes a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction
and does not violate the First Amendment." 69 In doing so, the court
conceded that the First Amendment protects political expression, but
warned that such protection is not absolute.70 The court noted that the
Constitution does not afford citizens the right to communicate views at
60. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 428.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 428-29.
63. Id. at 429.
64. Id.
65. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 429. The written regulations, as amended by the Association on July
21, 1992, state that: "No person, parties or organizations shall distribute any kind of literature, or
gather signatures for petitions, other than from a paid concession location-no walking concessions nor
gathering of signatures for petitions other than from a paid concession location will be allowed." Id.
(quoting the Association's written regulations). The Association's policy on the allocation of booth
space, as adopted June 10, 1993, states, in pertinent part:
III. Application forms will be available and new applications for concession and exhibit
space for the state fair shall be accepted by the Fair Association beginning on February I
of each year. Space shall be rented to new applicants on a first-come, first-serve basis
with the exception that fair management or its representative shall limit the number of
similar products being sold to an amount that permits reasonable sale opportunities.
Id. (quoting the Association's written policy regarding booth space).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 429.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 434.
70. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 431.
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any time, any place, or in any manner, but instead, the government's
interest in restricting the use of public property to its intended purpose
must be balanced against interests in the use of public property for
expressive activity.7 ' In making this determination, the State must prove
that its regulation is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest" and
that the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose. 72
The court concluded that the Association's regulation is content-
neutral in that it applies equally to all persons and organizations distribu-
ting any type of literature or gathering signatures for petitions at the
State Fair.73 Further, the court found that the Association's booth rental
policy furthered the requirement of time, place, and manner restrictions,
since new applicants are served on a first-come, first-serve basis.74
In arguing that the restriction serves a significant governmental
interest, the Association argued that it must limit the amount of literature
being distributed to control the flow of crowds, in addition to providing
public safety to those who attend the fair.75 The Association argued that
open solicitation in an environment as large as a state fair would disrupt
the flow of traffic and would serve as an inconvenience to those who
choose to participate in the initiative process. 76 The court agreed that the
Association's interest in providing for the convenience and safety of its
patrons is a significant governmental interest. 77
However, in furthering this interest, the court asserted that the
restriction must also leave open ample alternative channels for expres-
sion.78 In this case, communication alternatives were afforded to patrons
wishing to express themselves politically, since the Association's regula-
tion did not prohibit individuals from visiting, communicating, and
discussing initiative issues with fairground patrons. 79 Instead, the court
pointed out that the regulation only restricts the actual gathering of signa-
tures to the rented booths; it does not prohibit individuals from interact-
ing with the crowd.80
Finally, Bolinske asserted that the charge for booth space has a
chilling effect on free speech for those who cannot afford the fee. 8 1
71. Id.
72. Id. at 431.
73. Id. at 433.
74. Id. at 433-34.
75. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 434. The court pointed out that the fair has, in the past, drawn
approximately 250,000 patrons to the 164-acre site, which houses over 600 booths altogether. Id.




80. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 434.
81. Id. at 434.
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However, the court rejected that contention, stating that "[t]he Associa-
tion's regulation does not hamper, restrict, or impair the power of the
people to initiate. Rather, it structures and accommodates the petition
circulation process at the State Fair, together with all other activities
simultaneously occurring there." 82
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
district court. 83
Svedberg v. Stamness
In Svedberg v. Stamness,84 Anthony Stamness appealed a disorderly
conduct restraining order issued by the Grand Forks County district
court.8 5 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order and held
that there were reasonable grounds for issuance of the order because the
speech engaged in by the juvenile constituted "fighting words" which
were not protected under the First Amendment. 86
Anthony Stamness and Christian Svedberg, both minors, had been
engaged in an ongoing feud.87 At times during this feud, Stamness'
behavior towards Svedberg included building snow figures with very
large ears throughout the community, calling Svedberg "Dumbo," and
threatening Svedberg with bodily harm. 88 In response to this behavior,
Svedberg sought to obtain a disorderly conduct restraining order against
Stamness pursuant to section 12.1-31.2-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code.89 After hearing all of the evidence, the Grand Forks County
District Court found that the threats against Svedberg's physical safety,
in addition to the continuing teasing and harassment, which caused
82. Id. at 437. The court repeatedly noted that Bolinske's argument that the right to circulate and
solicit signatures for an initiative petition is absolute was unsubstantiated by any case law or
constitutional authority and, therefore, the court would not interpret Article IH. section I in such a
manner. Id. N.D. CONST. art. I1l, § I.
83. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 437. (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). Justice Sandstrom stated that the
rules promulgated by the Association were not content neutral because they singled out the "gathering
of signatures for petitions." Id. at 438. In furthering his vote for reversal of the summary judgment
dismissal, Justice Sandstrom argued that there was no interest compelling enough to justify such a
narrowly-tailored restriction, as there appeared to be no disruption of safety or convenience to the fair
patrons for the two days Bolinske was permitted to gather signatures throughout the fairgrounds. Id. at
438-39.
84. 525 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1994).
85. Svedberg v. Stamness,, 525 N.W.2d 678, 679 (N.D. 1994).
86. Id. at 683, 684. U.S. CONST. amend.
87. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 679.
88. Id. at 679-80. Specifically, Stamness, on one occasion, has stated to Svedberg, "You had
better watch it Dumbo or I will kill you." Id. at 680.
89. Id. at 679-680. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (Supp. 1993). Section 12.1-31.2-01 permits
a court to issue a restraining order when it finds that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the
respondent has engaged in disorderly conduct, which is codified under Section 12.1-31-01. Svedberg,.
525 N.W.2d at 680-81.
850 [VOL. 71:841
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Svedberg to be afraid to attend school, were grounds to issue the re-
straining order.90 Stamness appealed. 91
On appeal, Stamness raised two issues. 92 The first was whether the
district court erred in finding "reasonable grounds" to support its
issuance of a disorderly conduct restraining order.93 The second issue
was whether the restraining order improperly restrained Stamness' First
Amendment right to free speech.94
Stamness first argued that "reasonable grounds" for issuing the
disorderly conduct restraining order did not exist under section
12.1-31.2-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. 95 The North Dakota
Supreme Court, in deferring to the trial court's decision, the transcript,
and affidavits submitted in this case, held that reasonable grounds did
exist in support of issuing the order.96
In determining whether reasonable grounds existed, the court relied
on the term "probable cause," which is synonymous with the term
"reasonable grounds." 9 7  The court then defined "reasonable
grounds" as existing when "facts and circumstances presented to the
judge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that acts constituting the offense of disorderly conduct have been
committed." 98 Under that definition, and in the absence of proof by
Stamness as to how or where the district court erred, the supreme court
rejected Stamness' first contention.99
Stamness also contended that his actions were protected by the First
Amendment and that the trial court improperly excluded the activity
from First Amendment protection.10o Therefore, Stamness argued,
"reasonable grounds" did not exist and the issuance of the restraining
order was improper.101
In disagreeing with Stamness' contention, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court held that Stamness' actions constituted "fighting words"
and were therefore not protected under the First Amendment. 10 2 The
90. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 680-81. The order prohibited Stamness from visiting Svedberg
personally, harassing him on the phone, calling him abusive names, or any other injurious conduct to
Svedberg, physically or emotionally. Id. at 680.
91. Id. at 679.
92. Id. at 680.
93. Id.
94. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
95. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31.2-01 (Supp. 1993).
96. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682.
97. Id. at 681-82.
98. Id. at 682.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682.
102. Id. at 684. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19951
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court stated that although freedom of speech and of the press are pro-
tected under the First Amendment, such protection is not absolute. 103
Therefore, the court deferred to the determination of whether Stamness'
actions constituted "fighting words." 104
The test used by the supreme court in determining what constitutes
"fighting words" centers on whether the expression would cause a
reasonable and prudent person of common intelligence to immediately
breach the peace if such behavior was directed toward him or her.' 05
The court stated the importance of considering the context and the age
of the addressee when making this determination.106 In applying these
guidelines, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that "Stamness'
taunts, threats, including a threat to kill, and the public display of snow
effigies which . . . were constructed to harass Svedberg" were sufficient
to constitute fighting words when delivered to a fourteen-year-old
child.107 Therefore, the court held, the expressions made by Stamness
were "fighting words" and were consequently not protected by the First
Amendment. 108
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.109 Justice Levine dissented, expressing concern with the failure of
parental responsibilities and school administrative policies.I10 Specifical-
ly, Justice Levine commented on the failure of Stamness' parents to
prohibit and control their son's behavior."I' In addition, Justice Levine
stated her concern regarding the misuse of the statute by the trial court
in issuing such an order.112  Justice Levine explored the congressional
intent of passing such a statute and noted that such intent focused on the
concern and response to domestic violence and stalking, not teenage
behavior.11 3 Therefore, Justice Levine stated, this particular statute,
which imposes criminal penalties of up to one year in jail if violated,
should not be applied to teenagers who engage in the teasing and
ridicule of one another.114
103. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682.
104. Id. at 683.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 684.
107. Id.
108. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 684. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
109. Id. at 684. (Meschke, J., concurring). Justice Meschke's concurring opinion, in which Chief
Justice VandeWalle joined, stated approval for the trial court's decision that Stamness' conduct could
constitute a direct threat and incite an immediate breach of the peace. Id. at 684-85.
110. Id. at 685 (Levine, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 685.
114. Id. at 686.
852 [VOL. 71:841
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Further, Justice Levine expressed her disagreement with the majori-
ty's finding that Stamness' expressions fit under the unprotected catego-
ry of "fighting words.""l 5 Justice Levine agreed as to the probable
humiliation, pain, and embarrassment that Svedberg suffered, but could
find no risk of immediate breach of peace. 116 Ultimately, Justice Levine
stated that courts should not act as a substitute for parents and education-
al administrators.1 17
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co.
In Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co.,1 18 a widow filed a wrongful
death suit against a contractor and the State of North Dakota for the
accidental death of her husband at a road construction site.' 19 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that because there were no constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting the abolishment of sovereign immunity and
that the doctrine was outdated and no longer warranted, abolishment of
the sovereign immunity doctrine was appropriate.120 Furthermore, the
court held that, as a matter of law, the contractor did not have a legally
enforceable duty to travelers because it had no control over such travel-
lers during the winter months.121
On December 20, 1991, Lloyd Bulman, Jr. was killed in an automo-
bile accident at a road construction site on U.S. Highway 85 in North
Dakota. 122 At the time of the accident, the State's general contractor,
Hulstrand Construction, had suspended work on the project for the
winter. 123 Bulman's wife, Judy Ann Bulman, sued both the State of
North Dakota and Hulstrand Construction, alleging that the State was
negligent in failing to inspect and maintain the roadway, warn travelers
of the hazardous conditions, and to supervise Hulstrand's work on the
site.1 24 Bulman alleged that Hulstrand negligently failed to correct
dangerous driving conditions in the construction zone, to display ade-
quate warnings, and to comply with the contractual duties imposed by
the State.125
115. Id. (Levine, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 687.
118. 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994).
119. Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632, 633 (N.D. 1994).
120. Id. at 639-41.
121. Id. at 640-41.
122. Id. at 633.
123. Id.
124. Bulman, 525 N.W.2d at 633.
125. Id.
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The district court granted summary judgment dismissing Bulman's
complaint. 126 In doing so, the district court found that sovereign immu-
nity barred Bulman's suit against the State and that Hulstrand had no
legally enforceable duty to the traveling public.127 Bulman appealed.128
On appeal, Bulman argued for the judicial abolishment of sovereign
immunity for tort actions against the State.129 The State responded by
arguing that Article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution autho-
rizes only the Legislature, not the courts, to abolish sovereign immuni-
ty. 130
After concluding that the State's sovereign immunity for tort
liability is outdated and no longer warranted, the North Dakota Supreme
Court judicially abolished the entire doctrine.131 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the North Dakota Supreme Court read Article I, section 9 in its
entirety, harmonizing every word, sentence, and phrase, while affording
proper deference to the intent and purpose of those who adopted it.132
Although the second sentence of Article I had previously been construed
to limit an individual's guarantee that the courts will be open to them
and that a remedy by due process of law will be provided, the supreme
court re-evaluated the plain and unequivocal language in that sentence
and found that in context, the second sentence merely authorized the
Legislature to waive or modify the doctrine if it saw fit. 133 Without
specific and unequivocal language, the court stated that the second
sentence does not preclude the judicial abolishment of this commonlaw
doctrine if it no longer "meets the needs of time." 134 With this in mind,
the court expressly held that prior decisions upholding the commonlaw
doctrine of sovereign immunity are now obsolete. 135
In support of its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court de-
ferred to public policy, and found no reason to continue a constitutional
interpretation that condones harsh inequity and strips a citizen of his or
126. Id.
127. Id. at 633-34.
128. Id. at 634.
129. Bulman, 525 N.W.2d at 634.
130. Id. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. Article I, Section Nine of the North Dakota Constitution states
that, "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in such
cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct." Id.
131. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 639.
132. Id. at 636,637.
133. Id. at 637.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court found no reason to follow stare decisis to sustain such an "outdated, unfor-
giving common-law doctrine." Id. at 639.
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her sense of justice. 136  The court asserted that permitting an absolute
bar to tort liability merely because of the wrongdoer's status would only
contradict the underlying significance of tort liability that assigns
responsibility to individuals and corporations for the negligent acts of
their agents and employees during the course of employment.137
Therefore, because the State may not assert sovereign immunity, the
supreme court reversed the summary judgment dismissal against Bulman
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.138
As for Bulman's suit against Hulstrand, the court reviewed the
contract between Hulstrand and the State and determined that, as a matter
of law, Hulstrand did not have control over the site during the winter
suspension and, therefore, did not have a legally enforceable duty to
travelers.139 Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of Bulman's action against Hulstrand.140
Chief Justice VandeWalle strongly dissented, with his primary
concern focusing on the newly acquired vulnerability of commonlaw
doctrines that no longer meet the needs of time. 141 The Chief Justice
found no reason to abrogate such a doctrine, especially when the North
Dakota Constitution unequivocally bestows the Legislature with the
power to consent to suits filed against the State.142 VandeWalle stated
that it should make no difference that the doctrine is rooted in
commonlaw, but the important factor was that this doctrine was ultimate-
ly incorporated into the language of the North Dakota Constitution,
specifically Article 1, section 9.143
In response to the majority's treatment of stare decisis, the Chief
Justice opined that when reviewing commonlaw doctrines that have been
expressly incorporated into the Constitution, stare decisis should have no
application.144 Instead, as Justice VandeWalle explains, stare decisis
should only be applied in analyzing the construction of a provision in
the Constitution, and not the constitutional provision itself.145 In con-
136. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 638-39.
137. Id. at 638.
138. Id. at 641. The court permitted prospective abrogation to afford the North Dakota Legis-
lature time to prepare for the future impact of this decision. Id. at 640.
139. Id. at 640-41. The relevant portion of the contract between the State and Hulstrand states,
"[w]hen operations are suspended for the winter ... the roadway and the traffic control devices will
be maintained by the Department at its expense." Id. at 640 (quoting contract language).
140. Id. at 641. Justices Neumann and Sandstrom concurred in the opinion written by Justice
Levine, with Bert L. Wilson, Surrogate Judge sitting in place of Justice Meschke, joining in the
concurrence as well. Id.
141. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641 (VandeWalle, CJ., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. (VandeWalle, CJ., dissenting).
144. Id. at 642.
145. Id.
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cluding his dissent, the Chief Justice reiterated his position by character-
izing the majority's analysis as dangerous and unprincipled, as it essen-
tially contrived a new theory to overrule longstanding precedent.146
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau
In Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau ,147 Haney
appealed from a district court judgment affirming an order from the
North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau denying him benefits.1 48
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment,
reasoning that the agricultural exemption in the workers compensation
law did not violate the equal protection guarantee of the North Dakota
Constitution 149
Haney, appellant, a farm worker, injured his back while cleaning
grain bins for Grindberg Farms.150 Subsequently, Haney applied for
workers compensation benefits.151 Upon initial review of Haney's claim,
the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau determined that it did
not have jurisdiction and dismissed the claim. 152 Haney then requested a
formal hearing, at which the Bureau found that Haney had injured his
back while performing agricultural services for his employer, Grindberg
Farms.153 Accordingly, the bureau concluded that Haney was not
entitled to workers compensation benefits due to the agricultural em-
ployment exemption in section 65-01-02(22)(a) of the North Dakota
Century Code. 154 The district court affirmed the bureau's denial of
benefits.155
On appeal, Haney's primary contention was that the agricultural
exclusion violated the equal protection guarantee afforded to him by
Article I, section 21 of the North Dakota Constitution.156 However, the
North Dakota Supreme Court, applying a rational basis test,157 concluded
that the agricultural exemption was a rational means to promote the
146. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 642.
147. 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994).
148. Haney v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 196 (N.D. 1994).
149. Id. at 202. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21 (containing the state equal protection guarantee).
150. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 196.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 196.
154. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(22)(a) (Supp. 1993).
155. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 196.
156. Id. at 197. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21.
157. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 201-02. The court concluded that the relaxed rational basis test was
appropriate for determining the constitutional validity of a legislative classification. Id.
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legitimate state interest of providing injured workers employed in
"hazardous employment" with sure and certain relief, while not ad-
versely affecting the financial health of agricultural employers and
employees.158 Therefore, the court held that the agricultural exemption
did not violate the state's equal protection clause.159
Chief Justice VandeWalle added a special concurring opinion to
emphasize that the denial of workers' compensation benefits is not the
same as a denial of recovery for personal injury.160 Justice VandeWalle
asserted that the denial of recovery for personal injury affects one's
substantive rights, whereas the denial of workers compensation benefits
does not.161 He based his reasoning on the fact that the workers' com-
pensation system is not the exclusive source for a remedy, i.e. the injured
worker could bring an action against the employer.162
Surrogate Justice Ralph Erickstad delivered a strong dissent to the
majority's opinion.163 In his dissent, Justice Erickstad argued that the
majority's application of the rational basis test was misplaced, and that
the court should have adopted the intermediate "close correspondence"
test because the challenged statute infringed upon an "important sub-
stantive right," i.e., the right to recover for a personal injury.164 Justice
Erickstad further asserted that there was no discernible close correspon-
dence between the agricultural exclusion and the stated legislative goals
to justify unequal treatment for injured workers. 165 Accordingly, he
concluded that the agricultural exemption did not satisfy the intermedi-
ate "close correspondence" test, and was therefore unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution.166
Justice Meschke concurred with Surrogate Justice Erickstad's
dissent and added his own dissenting opinion to emphasize that the
158. id. at 202. Agricultural employers and employees are excluded from mandatory workers'
compensation coverage because agricultural services are not classified as hazardous employment. Id.
at 201.
159. Id. at 202. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21.
160. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202-04 (VandeWalle, CJ., concurring).
161. Id. at 202-03.
162. id.
163. Id. at 204-212 (Erickstad, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 205.
165. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 209.
166. Id.
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North Dakota workers compensation system is unconstitutionally under-
inclusive by excluding the wealth-based class of injured agricultural
workers.167
The district court's judgment was affirmed.168
CORPORATIONS -RIGHT TO LITIGATE
United Accounts, Inc. v. Teladvantage, Inc.
In United Accounts, Inc. v Teladvantage, Inc.,16 9 the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a corporation may not be represented in
litigation by a person who is not licensed to practice law. 170
In 1993, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a summary
judgment decision in favor of United Accounts, against Teladvantage. 171
During the litigation, Teladvantage was represented by Martin E.
O'Connor, who is not a licensed attorney.172 In its decision to affirm
summary judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court warned Mr.
O'Connor that corporations must be represented by licensed counsel
and cannot be represented pro se. 173 However, after remand, Tel-
advantage appealed and Mr. O'Connor continued to represent his
corporation throughout the litigation.174
On appeal, Teladvantage moved for relief from summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure,
asserting that it failed to respond to the original motion due to an
error. 175 In denying relief, the trial court recognized that Teladvantage
consciously chose not to respond to the motion despite being properly
notified and having an officer present at the hearing.176 Teladvantage
then appealed that decision by filing a notice of appeal and appellant's
brief, both of which were signed by O'Connor.177
In response to Teladvantage's appeal, United Accounts indicated
that O'Connor, who is not licensed to practice law, continues to represent
167. Id. at 212-14 (Meschke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Meschke's
opinion was in response to the majority's belief that exempting agricultural employers from the
expense of the workers compensation system was a legitimate state interest. Id. at 212-13.
168. Id. at 202.
169. 524 N.W.2d 605 (N.D. 1994).
170. United Accounts, Inc., v. Teladvantage, Inc. , 524 N.W.2d 605, 607 (N.D. 1994) [herein-
after Teladvantage II].
171. United Accounts, Inc. v. Teladvantage, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 115, 120 (N.D. 1993).
172. Id. at 117 n.l.
173. Id.
174. Teladvantage I1, 524 N.W.2d at 606.
175. Id. N.D.R. Ctv. P. 60(b).




the corporation and that no cost bond had been filed.178 The North
Dakota Supreme Court agreed with United Accounts and dismissed the
appeal as the court found no rule or statute that would allow an un-
licensed agent to represent a corporation.179
In opposition, the brief filed by O'Connor claimed that the court's
prior opinion warning that a corporation cannot be represented pro se
was in error and cited a South Dakota trial court decision that essentially
permitted a corporation to be represented by a non-licensed agent.180
While maintaining that corporations do not have a constitutional right to
be represented by non-licensed agents, the court asserted that it had no
duty to uphold a decison rendered by a trial court in a different jurisdic-
tion. 18 1
Since Mr. O'Connor was not permitted to represent his corporation
in any court proceeding, including the present one, the North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected the brief and summarily dismissed the appeal as
frivolous.182
CRIMINAL LAW-ADMISSIBILITY OF REFUSAL EVIDENCE
State v. Beaton
In State v. Beaton,183 Beaton appealed from a jury verdict finding
him guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.184 The North Dakota Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction, reasoning that if a defendant is not
given Miranda warnings, then only the mere fact or existence of a
refusal, not the actual words of the refusal, is admissible in evidence.185
Beaton, the appellant, was observed by Trooper Duane Stanley while
Beaton was asleep in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle. 186 The vehicle
was parked two-thirds of the way into the roadway with a beer can
outside the driver's door.187 Stanley approached the vehicle, removed
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the South Dakota trial court opined that,
under equal protection, a corporation is similar to a person and should be afforded the same rights. Id.
181. Teladvantage H, 524 N.W.2d at 606.
182. Id. at 607. The court also found that Teladvantage failed to give security for payment of
any costs awarded to the appellee pursuant to Rule 7 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Id. N.D. R. App. P. 7. The court noted that Teladvantage's failure to cure or justify this
omission only served to contribute to the dismissal of the appeal. Teladvantage II, 524 N.W.2d at 607.
183. 516 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1994).
184. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,646 (N.D. 1994).
185. Id. at 649.
186. Id. at 646.
187. Id.
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the key from the ignition, and awakened Beaton.l8 8 After awakening
Beaton, Stanley observed that Beaton had blood shot eyes and alcohol
on his breath.189 Stanley had Beaton perform several field sobriety tests,
and subsequently arrested him for actual physical control.190 After
handcuffing Beaton and placing him in the patrol car, Stanley read
Beaton an implied consent advisory.19' However, Stanley did not advise
Beaton that a refusal to take a chemical test could be used against him at
trial, nor did he advise Beaton of his Miranda rights.192 At the police
station, Beaton refused to submit to a chemical test. 193
On appeal, Beaton claimed that the trial court violated his privilege
against self incrimination, as guaranteed by Article I, section 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution, by admitting in evidence the actual words he
stated when he refused to submit to the chemical test. 194 The North
Dakota Supreme Court opined if Miranda warnings are not given to a
DUI arrestee then section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code
must be "literally and narrowly construed" to make only the fact or
existence of a refusal, not the defendant's actual words of refusal,
admissible in evidence. 195
Justice Levine dissented in the opinion, arguing that a police offi-
cer's inquiry as to whether a suspect is willing to submit to a chemical
test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, and accord-
ingly she did not believe that Stanley was required to give Beaton
Miranda warnings.196
The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the matter was
remanded for a new trial. 197
188. Id.





194. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 646-47. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12. Beaton also claimed that his
refusal to submit to a chemical test should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence, and that Stanley, a North Dakota Highway Patrolman, lacked jurisdiction to request
a chemical test in Minnesota. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 650. N.D. R. EvID. 403. However, the court
dismissed Beaton's jurisdictional argument as being without merit and the court did not address
Beaton's Rule 403 argument. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 650.
195. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 648-49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1987).
196. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d at 650-51 (Levine, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 650.
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CRIMINAL LAW -DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION
State v. Rasmussen
In State v. Rasmussen,198 Rasmussen appealed from a trial court
judgment finding him guilty of driving while his license was under
suspension, in violation of section 39-06-42 of the North Dakota Centu-
ry Code. 199 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
judgment, reasoning that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the
justification and excuse defenses, under chapter 12.1-05 of the North
Dakota Century Code, did not apply to a driving under suspension
charge despite the existence of life-threatening forces of nature. 200
Stutsman County deputy sheriffs, during an early morning investi-
gation of a break-in at a grain elevator in Windsor, North Dakota, found
that Rasmussen, appellant, had broken into the elevator to seek shelter
from the severe weather. 201 Apparently, Rasmussen walked to the
elevator after his car died about a quarter of a mile away.20 2 The deputy
sheriffs performed a records check and discovered that Rasmussen's
driver's license was suspended. 203 Accordingly, Rasmussen was arrested
for driving while his license was under suspension. 204 At trial,
Rasmussen unsuccessfully argued justification or excuse as a defense to
driving under suspension. 205 Rasmussen alleged that an acquaintance
was driving the car when bad weather and car trouble developed. The
acquaintance then hitch-hiked, leaving him alone with the car.206 After
sitting in the car for some time, Rasmussen claimed that he decided to
seek shelter from the weather and managed to drive the car close to
Windsor, where it broke down.207
On appeal, Rasmussen asserted that the trial court erred in denying
his justification or excuse defense. 208 The North Dakota Supreme Court
parsed the issue as to whether the defenses of justification or excuse are
available for the strict liability offense of driving under suspension. 209
The court determined that there is an affirmative defense available for
198. 524 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1994).
199. State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d 843 (N.D. 1994). N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-42 (1987 &
Supp. 1993).
200. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d at 845-46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
201. Rasmussen. 524 N.W.2d at 843.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 843.
205. Id. at 844.
206. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d at 843. Allegedly, Rasmussen's acquaintance was considering
purchasing the car and they were out on a test drive. Id. at 843-44.
207. Id. at 843.
208. Id. at 844. See N.D. CENT CODE § 12.1-05 (1987 & Supp. 1993).
209. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d at 845.
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driving under suspension when compulsion exists because of
life-threatening forces of nature. 210 In its analysis, the court first noted
that chapter 12.1-05 justifications and excuses may apply to offenses
outside the scope of the North Dakota Criminal Code.2 11 The court then
opined that whether such defenses apply to a particular strict liability
traffic offense depends upon a balancing of the public interests in law
enforcement and the public interests in self-preservation. 212 The court
concluded that public policy supports affording someone an affirmative
defense to the strict liability offense of driving under suspension when
he is faced with a life-threatening situation.2 13
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and
remanded for a new trial. 214
CRIMINAL LAW-HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS
City of Fargo v. McLaughlin
In City of Fargo v. McLaughlin215 McLaughlin appealed from a
jury verdict finding him guilty of driving under the influence of alco-
hol.216 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
reasoning that the trial court did not err in admitting opinion testimony
about the results of McLaughlin's horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN)
test.217
McLaughlin, appellant, was stopped by Officer Teres, after Ternes
observed McLaughlin's vehicle crash into a traffic sign.218 Ternes noted
that McLaughlin appeared disoriented, sleepy, and smelled of alcohol.219
At Ternes request, McLaughlin performed several field sobriety tests,
including the "one-leg stand," the "walk and turn," and the HGN
test.220 After failing these tests, McLaughlin was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol and was transported to a hospital for
210. Id. at 846.
211. Id. at 844.
212. Id. at 845.
213. Id.
214. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d at 846.
215. 512 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1994).
216. City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700,701 (N.D. 1994). McLaughlin requested an
extension of time to file a motion for a new trial, however, the trial court denied his motion. Id. at
701-02. McLaughlin appealed this ruling and the North Dakota Supreme Court found that his appeal
was timely under Rule 33(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 702-03. N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 33(c).
217. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d at 708.





treatment and a blood alcohol test.221 At the hospital, McLaughlin
refused to submit to a blood test, but later he obtained an independent
urine test. 222
At trial, Ternes was allowed to testify over objection about the
results of McLaughlin's HGN test. 223 McLaughlin's primary contention
on appeal was that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony into
evidence. 224 In analyzing McLaughlin's argument, the North Dakota
Supreme Court parsed the issue as being whether the State must meet the
Frye standard through expert testimony as a prerequisite to admissibility
of HGN test results. 225 The court concluded that the HGN test consists
of widely accepted principles and therefore it is unnecessary to require
the State to establish the scientific reliability of these tests through expert
testimony .226
Acordingly, the judgment of conviction was affirmed. 227
CRIMINAL LAW -JURY INSTRUCTIONS
State v. Azure
In State v. Azure, 228 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor who addressed each jury member by name did not commit
prejudicial error and that jury instructions which did not include refer-
ence to having an "abiding conviction" of guilt when referring to the
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, were grounds for finding revers-
ible error.229 On January 15, 1993, Andrew Azure, a police officer, and
two of his friends escorted three minor females to a bar in Rolette
County, North Dakota.230 Although the young women were apprehen-
sive about entering the bar, Azure assured them that they had nothing to
worry about because they were with him.231 Inside the bar, Azure and
his friends took turns buying drinks for everybody, including the
minors.232 The group left around midnight, and on their way out, Azure
221. Id.
222. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d at 701.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 703. McLaughlin also claimed that the trial court erred by allowing Ternes to testify
about McLaughlin's independent urine test. Id. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that
McLaughlin did not properly preserve this question for appeal since he failed to object to the
admission of this evidence at trial. Id.
225. Id. at 705.
226. Id. at 706.
227. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d at 708.
228. 525 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1994).
229. State v. Azure, 525 N.W.2d 654, 656,659 (N.D. 1994).
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purchased a case of beer and a bottle of alcohol.233 Five of the six
people, including the three young women, piled into the cab of Azure's
truck where they all shared the bottle of alcohol that Azure had brought
into the cab with him. 234 One of the minors was driving the truck.235
While on patrol, a Rolette County deputy received a report of a
possible drunk driver which included the description of the vehicle. 236
The deputy later observed that same vehicle driving in excess of the
posted speed limit and subsequently initiated a traffic stop. 237 The
deputy recognized Azure and asked him to step outside of the truck. 238
After Azure insisted that he would not get out because the truck had
been stopped in a potentially hazardous location, the deputy told the
driver to pull off on a nearby gravel road.239 The driver of the truck
pulled ahead, but did not pull onto the gravel road and, instead, she
continued to drive for three to four miles before the deputy activated his
lights.240 When the truck stopped, the deputy again requested that Azure
get out of the vehicle.24 1 After Azure refused, the deputy told Azure to
"wait a minute" while he went back to the patrol car to use the radio.242
While the deputy was using his radio, Azure fled the scene. 243
Azure was not pursued at that time, however the deputy placed the
intoxicated minors in his patrol car. 244 Azure was later charged with
delivery of alcohol to a minor and fleeing or attempting to elude a
police officer.245 On September 30, 1993, a jury found Azure guilty on
both charges and Azure appealed.246
Azure first argued that the prosecutor's closing statements were
improper and, therefore, his guilty verdict should be reversed. 247 Specif-
ically, Azure contended that the prosecutor erred in referring to the
jurors by name in closing and in requesting that the jurors send a
233. Id.






239. Azure, 525 N.W.2d at 655.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 655-56.
243. Id. at 656.
244. Azure, 525 N.W.2d at 656.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 655-56. Azure initially filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial
court. Id. at 656. Azure attempted to appeal from that denial, however, because the motion for a new
trial was untimely, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that it had proper jurisdiction for appeal from
the September 30, 1994, guilty verdict. Id.
247. Id. at 656.
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message to the defendant through their verdict.248 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that neither statement by the prosecutor required
reversal .249
In addressing whether the prosecutor's address to each and every
jury member by name constituted plain error,250 the court held that
because the prosecutor did not single out a specific juror in her intro-
duction, the closing argument was not prejudicial. 251 Although the court
stated that the salutation may have been improper, they found no author-
ity that would support reversal for an introduction that does not single
out a particular juror for whatever reason.252
Azure also argued that the prosecutor's request to the jury that they
send a message was prejudicial. 253 However, the North Dakota Supreme
Court disagreed and held that because the prosecutor's argument did not
request that the jury consider the effects of the defendant's acquittal on
the community, the statement was not prejudicial. 254 Azure cited two
cases as authority for his position, but, the court stated, this authority
only stood for the proposition that the jury should be asked to convict
on the basis of guilt and not on the potential impact that such a verdict
would have on the community. 255 Because the prosecutor in this case
asked the jury to decide what conduct is acceptable for law enforcement
officers and did not call upon the jury to police social order, the court
found that the statements made in closing argument were not improper
and did not require reversal.256
Azure's second contention on appeal was that the trial court's jury
instruction on reasonable doubt was impermissible and, thus, required
reversal. 257 Azure objected to the proposed jury instruction prior to trial,
but the court disagreed and instructed the jury differently.2 58 Azure first
contended that the court's jury instruction was incorrect because it
contained the language: "It is the kind of doubt which would make a
248. Id. at 655-56. The transcript, which the court noted as being filled with errors, read as fol-
lows: "Ms. Giron, Mr. Wawryk, Ms. Foss, Ms. Davis, Mr. Coleman, Ms. Azure, Mr. Hardy, Mr.
Henry, Ms. Baker, this is your community. Send a message from this courtroom that your community,
law enforcement officer[s] are not above the law." Id.
249. Azure, 525 N.W.2d at 656-57.
250. Id. at 656. Since Azure did not object at trial to the jurors being addressed by name, nor did
Azure move for a mistrial on those grounds, the proper standard of review for the court is to review
the records for plain error. id.
251. Id. at 656-57.
252. Id. at 657.
253. Id.
254. Azure, 525 N.W.2d at 657.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 658.
258. Id. at 657-68.
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reasonable person hesitate to act in matters of great importance." 259
Azure cited authority that language with such a limitation allows the jury
to convict below a standard of reasonable doubt. 260 However, in reject-
ing that argument, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the
precise language used in this case by the trial court was proper as the
distinction between the language "hesitate to act," as used in this case,
rather than "to act" was explicitly endorsed by the United States Su-
preme Court. 261
Azure further maintained that the trial court's instruction unneces-
sarily repeated the phrase "reasonable person hesitate to act." 262
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this contention,
noting that the model instruction for the Eighth Circuit used that same
language .263
Further, Azure argued that the absence of the language "moral
certainty" in the instruction was reversible error.264 Again, the supreme
court rejected that argument on the grounds that the phrase is outdated,
is no longer used by the United States Supreme Court, and its meaning
has continually changed to the point of conflicting with the standard of
reasonable doubt.265
Azure's final contention on appeal addressed the absence of the
language "abiding conviction" in the instructions to the jury. 2 66 In
upholding this contention, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned
that the phrase "abiding conviction," when used in conjunction with the
phrase "moral certainty," was appropriate. 267 However, the court stated,
the absence of the "abiding conviction" language from the instruction
did not impress upon the jury the "need to reach a subjective state of
near certitude of guilt" and, therefore, does not adequately convey the
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt."268 The court concluded that
the absence of "abiding conviction" in the trial court's instruction
constituted reversible error.269
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
remanded for a new trial. 270
259. Azure, 525 N.W.2d at 658.
260. Id.
261. Id. (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1250 (1994)).
262. Id. at 658.
263. Id. at 658-59.
264. Azure, 525 N.W.2d at 659.
265. Id. The court also noted that the absence of this phrase may have been to Azure's benefit,
as jurors could have been confused enough to convict on less than reasonable doubt. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1247 (1994)).




CRIMINAL LAW - MURDER
State v. Ash
In State v. Ash,271 Ash appealed from a jury verdict and judgment
convicting him of murder, and an order denying his motion for a new
trial.272 Despite Ash's agglomeration of arguments, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 273 reasoning that: (1) the trial
court did not commit an abuse of discretion by refusing to allow a
continuance so that the defense attorney could take a videotape deposi-
tion of an expert witness; 274 (2) the admission of a photograph of Ash,
and a photograph of Kern (victim) and his family, was appropriate to
allow the jury to see the difference in size between the two men;275 (3) it
was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court to prohibit Ash's
attorney from cross-examination about the importance of motive in a
homicide case; 2 7 6 (4) cross-examination of Ash regarding his prior
conviction for aggravated assault was permissible to establish motive and
rebut an accident defense; 277 (5) testimony of Ash's probation officer
was admissible to rebut Ash's alibi as to his whereabouts at the time of
the murder; 278 (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
questions on cross-examination over defense counsel's objections; 279
(7) the trial court's jury instructions adequately informed the jury of the
applicable law regarding the definitions of "knowingly" and "inten-
tionally;" 280 (8) the trial court did not err in communicating with the
jury through the use of written notes, outside the courtroom, without Ash
being present; 28 1 (9) it was within the discretion of the trial court to allow
the prosecution's arguments and demonstrations during closing argu-
ment; 282 and (10) the trial court did not exceed its authority by sentenc-
ing Ash as a dangerous special offender under section 12.1-32-09 of the
North Dakota Century Code. 283
271. 526 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1995).
272. State v. Ash, 526 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1995).
273. Id. at 483.
274. Id. at 476.
275. Id. at 477.
276. Id.
277. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 479.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 480.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 481.
282. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 481-83.
283. Id. at 483. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
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On February 19, 1993, Ash, appellant, was riding as a passenger in
Kern's pickup as the two traveled from Hettinger, North Dakota to
attend a party in Lemmon, South Dakota.284 In the early morning hours
of February 20, 1993, Kern and Ash set out to return to Hettinger where
a few miles outside of Hettinger, Ash shot Kern in the back of head with
a rifle. 285 Ash returned the rifle to its case behind the seat of Kern's
pickup, moved Kern's body to the passenger seat, and drove toward
Hettinger. 286 Before reaching Hettinger, Ash left the highway to dispose
of Kern's body. 287 While attempting to leave the scene, Ash got the
pickup stuck in the ditch and had to hitch a ride to the lodge where he
was staying in Hettinger. 288 At the lodge, Ash told his roommate that he
and Kern were involved in a fight in Lemmon, then Ash put his bloody
clothes in a garbage bag and discarded them into a dumpster. 289 Subse-
quently, Ash was convicted of murder and sentenced to life impris-
onment .290
On appeal, Ash asserted several arguments.291 First, Ash contended
that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a continu-
ance that would permit his attorney to travel to Texas to take a videotape
deposition of an expert witness. 292 The North Dakota Supreme Court,
noting that a decision to grant a motion for a continuance is within the
discretion of the trial court, ruled that the trial court had made reason-
able attempts to accommodate the expert's schedule and therefore it did
not abuse its discretion. 293
Ash's second contention was that the trial court made several
erroneous evidentiary rulings. 294 Ash contended that the trial court
erred by admitting two photographs into evidence, one of Kern and his
family, and one of Ash at his initial appearance. 295 The North Dakota
Supreme Court opined that the photographs were not unfairly prejudi-
cial and were relevant because the photographs demonstrated the
284. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 475. Ash, who was temporarily working in the Hettinger area, had met
Kern the previous weekend at a tavern in Hettinger, and Kern gave Ash a ride to Lemmon on that
occasion as well. Id.
285. Id. Ash later claimed that the shooting was accidental. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 475. Ash dragged Kern's body into a field and covered it with snow. Id.
288. Id. at 476.




293. Id. The trial had already been postponed once to accommodate the expert's schedule, so
the trial court determined that other alternatives should be employed rather than imposing another
delay. Id. Accordingly, the trial court suggested that the expert could either testify on a weekend, or
a videotaped deposition could be recorded by telephone. Id.
294. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 476-80.
295. Id. at 476-77.
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strength needed to lift and drag Kern's body.296 Therefore, the court
concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion, under Rule 403
of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, in admitting the photographs. 297
Ash claimed that the trial erred by refusing to allow his attorney to
cross-examine Adams County Sheriff Robert Bartz about the importance
of motive in a homicide case. 2 98 The North Dakota Supreme Court
found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
this examination because Ash's attorney was permitted to examine the
witness and show that Bartz had indeed attempted to establish a motive in
the case, though he was not successful. 299 Furthermore, Ash asserted that
the trial court erred in allowing a cross-examination regarding his prior
conviction for aggravated assault. 300 However, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court, in accordance with Rule 403 of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence, found that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any
prejudice to Ash because of possible connections between Ash's condi-
tions of probation, i.e., refraining from intoxicating substances and
maintaining steady employment, and his conduct surrounding the inci-
dent at question. 30 1
Ash's next argument was that the trial court erred in communicat-
ing with the jury in his absence without bringing the jury into the
courtroom.302 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial
296. Id. at 477. The court also noted that Ash's physical appearance had vastly changed since
the murder, therefore admitting the photographs was the only way to adequately apprise the jury of
Ash and Kern's actual sizes and appearances at the time of the crime. Id.
297. Id. N.D.R. EvID. 403.
298. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 477.
299. Id. The court also noted that the trial court gave an instruction about motive to the jury. Id.
Also in regard to jury instructions, Ash claimed that the trial court erred in failing to give his
requested instruction on murder. Id. at 480. Also, Ash alleged that the trial court's jury instructions,
defining "intentionally" and "knowingly," were incorrect statements of the law. Id. However, the
North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the instructions used by the trial court adequately informed the
jury of the applicable law, and therefore concluded that the trial court did not err in giving these
instructions nor by refusing to give Ash's requested instruction. Id.
300. Id. at 478. Ash also claimed that the trial court erred by allowing his expert witness to be
cross-examined beyond the scope of direct examination. Id. at 479. However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court opined that the scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and concluded that the challenged questions were marginally within the scope of the direct
examination. Id. at 480.
301. Id. at 478-79. N.D. R. EVID. 403. Also, with respect to Ash's probation, Ash claimed that
the trial court erred by allowing his probation officer to testify on the grounds that her testimony was
irrelevant. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 479. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that this
testimony was relevant for impeachment value and for showing that Ash had violated the conditions of
his probation. Id.
302. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 480-81. On three different occasions the jury made written requests of
the court, and each time the trial court responded without bringing the jury into the courtroom and
without Ash's presence, as is required by section 29-22-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at
481. N.D. CEr. CODE § 29-22-05 (1991).
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court did err, but since Ash was not prejudiced by these communications,
the error was harmless. 303
Ash also complained that he was prejudiced by three improper
statements and an improper demonstration made during the prosecu-
tion's closing argument. 304 However, Ash's attorney did not object at
trial to any of these arguments, nor to the demonstration, thereby failing
to preserve the issues for appeal. 305 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme
Court noted that its review was limited to determining whether the trial
court committed obvious error, which the court found it did not. 306
Ash's final assertion was that the trial court exceeded its authority
by sentencing him as a dangerous special offender, as defined in section
12.1-32-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, because his sentence, i.e.,
life imprisonment, could not be further extended. 307 The North Dakota
Supreme Court found Ash's argument to be unpersuasive and noted that
if any error existed it was harmless since it would have no legal effect. 308
Justice Levine issued a separate opinion, concurring in result, in
order to emphasize her disapproval with the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment regarding the burden of proof.309
Justice Neumann also delivered a special concurring opinion, in
which he addressed the majority's analysis of the jury communication
issue. 3 10 Justice Neumann emphasized that even if a defendant has
previously waived his right to be present while a jury question is consid-
ered, this should not determine whether it is reversible error to subse-
quently communicate with the jury in the absence of the defendant.3 11
Furthermore, Justice Neumann noted that a difference exists between a
303. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 481. The court was influenced by the fact that Ash previously had
repeatedly waived his presence. Id.
304. Id. at 481-83.
305. Id. at 482.
306. Id. at 483. Ash asserted that the prosecutor argued reasons why Ash's defenses of alibi,
insanity, and self-defense were inapplicable, and that the prosecutor ridiculed his accident defense.
Id. at 482. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor's argument was an
efficient summary of the evidence. Id. Ash also complained about the prosecutor's burden of proof
argument, in which the prosecutor noted that all of the inmates in the North Dakota State Penitentiary
were convicted under the same burden. Id. The court opined that this argument was an acceptable
attempt to undercut the State's enormous burden. Id. Finally, Ash claimed that he was unfairly
prejudiced by the prosecutor emphasizing the impact of Kern's death on his family, and the sorrow
Kern's family would feel at Christmas. Id. However, the court concluded that although these
arguments may have been melodramatic they did not constitute reversible error. Id.
With respect to the demonstration, in which Sherrif Bartz was allowed to lie on the courtroom
floor while the prosecutor pointed a gun inches from the back of his head, Ash claimed that it was
inappropriate. Id. at 482-83. However, the court concluded that the demonstration provided an
acceptable visual summarization of the State's theory. Id. at 483.
307. Id. at 483. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
308. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 483.
309. Id. (Levine, J., concurring).
310. Id. at 483-84 (Neumann, J., concurring).
311. Id. at 484.
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defendant's constitutional right to appear and the statutory right to be
present to respond to jury questions, and that this difference should be
considered upon judicial review. 312
Ash's conviction of murder was affirmed.313
CRIMINAL LAW -SEARCH AND SEIZURE
City of Bismarck v. Uhden
In City of Bismarck v. Uhden,314 the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld the City of Bismarck's sobriety checkpoint as constitutional since
it did not violate North Dakota's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 315
On June 20, 1992, Dale Uhden was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint
while riding his motorcycle.3 16 At this particular checkpoint, which was
established by the Bismarck Police Department, only eastbound traffic
was stopped. 317 Prior to being stopped, Uhden was not observed to have
violated any traffic laws.318 Nevertheless, Uhden was asked to turn off
his vehicle and show the Bismarck Police officer his driver's license. 319
Upon doing so, the officer could detect that Uhden had an odor of
alcohol about his person as well as bloodshot eyes and poor balance. 320
The officer then administered field sobriety tests, which Uhden failed. 321
Uhden was subsequently arrested for driving under the influence. 322
Uhden pled not guilty and moved to suppress evidence of his
impairment. 323 The Bismarck Municipal Court judge concluded that the
stop was illegal and suppressed the evidence of impairment. 324 After the
case was dismissed, the City appealed the decision to county court, where
Uhden once more made a motion to suppress the evidence. 325 During
the appeal, Uhden did not allege that the City's appeal constituted
double jeopardy, but instead argued that review was strictly limited to the
record below. 326 The county court rejected Uhden's arguments and,
312. Id.
313. Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 483.
314. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994).
315. City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 378-79 (N.D. 1994).








324. Id. at 374-75.
325. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 375.
326. Id.
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after hearing testimony from additional witnesses, found that the stop of
Uhden was permissible. 327 After denying Uhden's request for a jury
trial, the county court remanded the case back to municipal court, where
a trial was held and Uhden was convicted of DUI.328 After his convic-
tion, Uhden again appealed to county court and repeated his motion to
suppress the evidence, which was subsequently denied.329
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Uhden challenged
the permissibility of sobriety checkpoints in addition to asserting double
jeopardy .330
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the automobile sobriety
checkpoint administered by the Bismarck Police Department did not
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure as prohibited by the North
Dakota Constitution. 331 In so holding, the supreme court concluded that
North Dakota law does not itself prohibit police agencies from using
checkpoints. 332 The court also considered the public interests and
purposes of Bismarck's sobriety checkpoint and balanced them against
the degree of intrusion experienced by an individual. 333 The court
found that society's need for safe roadways outweighed the minimal
degree of intrusion that one may experience when stopped at a sobriety
checkpoint .334
In reviewing the constitutionality of this particular checkpoint, the
court referred to the record before it, which included the directives of the
guidelines and operational briefing which were specifically prepared by
the Bismarck Police Department for this checkpoint. 335 In the absence
of any reflection in the record to rebut the evidence, the court found that
the checkpoint was reasonable and constitutional. 336 In making this
determination, the court concluded that the "strictures of the guidelines
and briefing adequately advance the public interests and limit interfer-




330. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 375. Uhden defined the second issue as: "Does double jeopardy
arise when an individual acquitted in municipal court is retried in county court and convicted in a trial
de novo granted after the city appeals the acquittal?" Id.
331. Id. at 378-79. The North Dakota Supreme Court expressly stated that this decision did not
hold that all sobriety checkpoints are per se constitutional under the North Dakota Constitution. Id.
332. Id. at 376. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991) (specifying when law enforcement may
stop and question individuals abroad).
333. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 378.
334. Id. at 377-78.
335. Id. at 378-79.
336. Id. at 379.
337. Id. In making this finding, the court considered the time of the checkpoint; the frequency
and consistency of the traffic stops; who, if anyone, had the discretion as to whom to stop; the location
of the checkpoint; the lighting available at the checkpoint; and the use of signs, flares, cones, and other
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On the double jeopardy issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that because evidence was not heard by the fact finding judge in
municipal court, the judge properly dismissed Uhden's action instead of
acquitting him. 338 Because of the dismissal, the City was statutorily
authorized to appeal the decision; therefore, double jeopardy did not
attach .339
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the county court. 3 4 0
CRIMINAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION
State v. Satrom
In State v. Satrom,341 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a
DUI defendant's statement about how much he had to drink was admis-
sible, but that specific statements made by a defendant in refusing to take
a chemical test without the presence of an attorney were not admissible
since such a line of questioning violates a defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination *342
In the early morning hours of November 20, 1993, Trooper Duane
Stanley was patrolling Interstate 29 in Fargo when he heard the sound of
screeching tires and observed a car swerving on a nearby exit ramp.343
As he followed the vehicle, Trooper Stanley noticed that the car had
expired license plates and decided to initiate a traffic stop.3 44 After
pulling over the driver, William Satrom, Trooper Stanley noticed that the
driver had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath in addition to having
watery, red, bloodshot eyes. 345 Satrom could not provide proof of
registration, so Trooper Stanley requested that Satrom accompany him
to the patrol car.346 Inside the patrol car, Trooper Stanley asked Satrom
about his drinking that night and Satrom answered that he had "four or
five drinks."347 After administering field sobriety tests, Trooper Stanley
arrested Satrom for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors
safety devices which would alert drivers without causing them to be frightened or annoyed. Id. at
378-79.
338. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 380.
339. Id. at 379.
340. Id. at 380.
341. 524 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1994).
342. State v. Satrom, 524 N.W.2d 92, 93-94 (N.D. 1994).




347. Satrom. 524 N.W.2d at 93.
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and drove Satrom to the police station. 348 At the police station, Satrom
refused to take a breath "intoxilyzer" test.349
At trial, a jury found Satrom guilty of driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquors. 350 Satrom appealed his conviction and main-
tained two issues. 351 First, Satrom argued that his statements to Trooper
Stanley that he had "four or five drinks" should have been excluded at
trial because Miranda warnings had not been given. 352 Second, Satrom
argued that his specific statements with regard to his refusal of the
chemical test were inadmissible for the same reason. 353
In response to Satrom's first argument, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is in
custody and is being interrogated. 354 Because Satrom was not in custody
when the statements regarding the number of drinks he had consumed
were given, such statements were correctly admitted into evidence.355
In deciding the second issue, the court referred to recent precedent
and held that the line of questioning that inquired into whether Satrom
made "any specific statement with regard to" his chemical test refusal
went beyond what section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code
permits. 356 Since the line of questioning in this case inquired into the
specific statements made by Satrom regarding his refusal, the North




In State v. Schroeder,358 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
a physician's testimony regarding his observations and examination of




351. Id. at 93, 94.
352. Satrom, 524 N.W.2d at 93.
353. Id. at 94.
354. Id. at 93.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 94. The supreme court relied on the holding in State v. Beaton, which held that when
a defendant is not given Miranda warnings, section 39-20-08 of the North Dakota Century Code must
be "literally and narrowly construed" to admit into evidence just the fact of the refusal and not the
specific statements made by the defendant of the refusal. State v. Beaton, 516 N.W.2d 645,648 (N.D.
1994). N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1987).
357. Satrom, 524 N.W.2d at 94.
358. 524 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1994).
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dant was under the influence of intoxicants, violated the
physician-patient privilege.359
On May 12, 1993, Dallas Schroeder was rushed to the emergency
room at Dakota Hospital in Fargo after his involvement in a one-vehicle
motorcycle crash on Interstate 29.360 While being treated for head
injuries by Dr. Robert Lane Tassin, the Cass County Sheriff's Depart-
ment dispatched a deputy to the hospital in response to the accident. 361
In the emergency room, Deputy Nitschke contacted Schroeder and
detected the odor of alcohol on Schroeder's breath. 362 Schroeder told
Deputy Nitschke that he had been drinking earlier that night. 363 After
reading Schroeder an implied consent advisory, Deputy Nitschke arrest-
ed him for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors and
ordered that a blood sample be taken. 364 The result of that test estab-
lished that the blood-alcohol concentration in Schroeder's system was
.11 percent. 365
At trial, Schroeder unsuccessfully objected to the admission of the
blood test ordered by Deputy Nitschke. 366 Deputy Nitschke testified to
his observations of and statements made by Schroeder while Schroeder
was being treated in the emergency room. 367 Brad Espe, a witness to the
accident, also testified as to his own observations of Schroeder that
night.368
The State called Dr. Tassin to testify in its case-in-chief, but the trial
court refused to permit Dr. Tassin to testify to any statements Schroeder
may have made to him. 369 The trial court also refused to consider
blood-alcohol test results that were taken for Dr. Tassin's diagnostic
purposes. 370 Nevertheless, Dr. Tassin was permitted, over Schroeder's
objection, to testify about his observations and examination of
Schroeder, which included observations that Schroeder had an odor of
359. State v. Schroeder, 524 N.W.2d 837, 842 (N.D. 1994).








368. Id. The witness Espe stated that he visually observed Schroeder's motorcycle traveling at a
high speed before colliding with a pole. Id. Espe further testified that upon contacting Schroeder at
the scene of the accident, Espe could smell an odor of alcohol on Schroeder's breath and that he
believed Schroeder was under the influence of alcohol. Id.
369. Schroeder, 524 N.W.2d at 838.
370. Id.
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alcohol on his breath. 371 Among other things, Dr. Tassin testified that he
believed that Schroeder was under the influence of alcohol. 372
Schroeder was found guilty and appealed, arguing that section
39-20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code requires that a law enforce-
ment official give DUI suspects implied consent advisories after a DUI
arrest, not before. 373 Therefore, Schroeder argues, the results of his
chemical test must be suppressed. 374 The North Dakota Supreme Court
refused to consider this argument, as Schroeder failed to raise the issue
in a pretrial motion. 375 The court stated that since Schroeder did not
prove "just cause" for his failure, he waived his right to preserve the
issue for appeal. 376
Schroeder further argued that Dr. Tassin violated the
patient-physician privilege permitted under Rule 503 of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence when he testified about his observations and
treatment of Schroeder. 377  The State responded that because Dr.
Tassin's testimony did not contain "verbal statements" made by
Schroeder, Dr. Tassin did not violate the physician-patient privilege. 378
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the State's argument and
refused to construe the word "communications" that narrowly. 37 9
Maintaining that the physician-patient privilege authorized under Rule
503 is not limited to verbal assertions but applies to all communications,
including physician observations and a patient's oral and written state-
ments, the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on principles of statutory
construction, evidentiary analysis, and common law. 380 After such
analysis, the court held that the physician-patient privilege under Rule
503 applies to "information and observations made by a physician for
purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's medical condit
ion." 381 Because Dr. Tassin gave testimony that was obtained for the
purposes of Schroeder's diagnosis and treatment, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in permitting Dr.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 838-39.
373. Id. at 839. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1993). Schroeder concedes that he was given
implied consent warnings before the arrest. Schroeder, 524 N.W.2d at 839.
374. Schroeder, 524 N.W.2d at 839.
375. Id. The court stated that Rule 12(b)(3) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
require that a motion to suppress evidence because it was illegally obtained must be raised before trial
and failure to do so constitutes a waiver unless the movant can establish "just cause." Id. N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
376. Schroeder, 524 N.W. 2d at 839.
377. Id. N.D.R. EviD. 503.
378. Schroeder, 524 N.W. 2d at 839.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 839-42. N.D.R. EVID. 503.
381. Schroeder, 524 N.W.2d at 842.
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Tassin to testify as to those observations and his subsequent opinion of
Schroeder's intoxication. 382
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
remanded for further proceedings. 383
DRAM SHOP ACT-LIABILITY OF HOST
Born v. Mayers
In Born v. Mayers ,384 the United States District Court for the District
of North Dakota certified two questions of law, regarding dram shop
liability, to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 385 The North Dakota
Supreme Court answered the questions finding that the North Dakota
Dram Shop Act may create a right of action against any party who: (1)
gives another an intoxicating liquor as an act of hospitality or social
courtesy; or (2) gives another an intoxicating liquor without receiving
direct pecuniary gain, but nevertheless in an attempt to promote business
good will.386
The events giving rise to the underlying lawsuit revolve around an
altercation at Mayers' (defendant) house between Born (plaintiff's
husband) and Fuglestad.387 Before the altercation, the group had been
drinking at the Rogers Bar in Rogers, Minnesota. 388 Mayers bought
drinks for the group and charged them to the account of his employer,
Wheat-Land Elevator Corporation. 389 When the bar closed, the group
went to Mayers' house with a case of beer that Mayers purchased from
the bar. 390 After about an hour of drinking at Mayers' house, Fuglestad
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994).
385. Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687, 688 (N.D. 1994). The certified questions were stated
specifically as follows:
I. Does the North Dakota Dram Shop Act, section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code, create a right of action against a party not engaged in the business of
selling intoxicating liquor, who gives another an intoxicating liquor as an act of hospitality
or social courtesy?
II. Does the North Dakota Dram Shop Act, section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code, create a right of action against a party not engaged in the business of
selling intoxicating liquor, who gives another an intoxicating liquor without direct





389. Id. Mayers was employed as an elevator manager for Wheat-Land, and as part of his em-
ployment Mayers was authorized to promote good will by entertaining customers and people in the
community. Id. Wheat-Land also provided Mayers with the house in Rogers where the altercation
occurred. Id.
390. Born. 514 N.W.2d at 688.
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apparently became agitated with Born and struck him in the face with the
back of his hand.391 Fuglestad's blow caused Born to fall backward on
his chair and land on the floor. 3 92 Fuglestad attempted to strike Born
again but another member of the group intervened and Fuglestad's
second punch merely grazed Born. 393 After the altercation, the group
dismissed and Born walked home under his own power and went to
sleep. 394 However, the next day Born suffered a stroke due to a severed
carotid artery wall in his neck. 395 The stroke left Born with minimal
mental and physical capabilities. 396 Subsequently, Born's wife (plaintiff)
initiated a diversity action in federal district court alleging that Mayers
violated section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota Century Code by fur-
nishing alcohol to an "obviously intoxicated person," who caused her
husband's injury.397
During oral argument, the defendants asserted that it would be
ludicrous and absurd to impose liability upon a social host who gratu-
itously provides alcohol beverages to a friend or relative. 398 However,
rather than strictly limiting dram shop liability to "professional mer-
chants of alcohol," the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the
North Dakota Dram Shop Act, section 5-01-06.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code, creates a cause of action against "any person" who
knowingly provides alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated
person. 399
Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme Court answered both
certified questions in the affirmative.400
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT-STIPULATED EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
Anderson v. Anderson
In Anderson v. Anderson,40' the North Dakota Supreme Court held




394. Id. It appeared that the only injury Born incurred during the altercation was a cut lip. Id.
395. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 688.
396. Id. at 688-89.
397. Id. at 689. See N.D. C rEN. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987). Mrs. Born also alleges that Wheat-
Land is vicariously liable for Mayers' actions. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 689.
398. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690.
399. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987).
400. Born, 514 N.W.2d at 690.
401. 522 N.W.2d 476 (ND. 1994).
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daughter's educational expenses to a state-sponsored college was sup-
ported by evidence. 402
Lane and Myrna Anderson were divorced on December 30,
1983.403 The divorce decree was based on a stipulation agreed to by the
parties. 40 4 This stipulation, which was incorporated by reference into the
divorce judgment, contained an educational provision for the chil-
dren. 405 In the fall of 1988, Lane's oldest child, Teri Lynn, entered the
University of North Dakota and remained in attendance until she gradu-
ated in the spring of 1991.406 While at UND, academic scholarships,
earned income, and funds from an educational trust set up by her
paternal grandparents, were used to fund Teri Lynn's education.4 07 In
the fall of 1991, Teri Lynn entered her first year of law school at the
University of Missouri at Kansas City. 40 8 It was at that time that Ten
Lynn requested financial assistance from her father. 40 9
When Lane refused to honor her request, Teri Lynn resorted to
funding her education with student loans. 4 10 Teri Lynn's mother,
Myrna, then moved the district court to order Lane to pay the costs of
Teri Lynn's fourth year of post-secondary education, specifically, Teri
Lynn's first year of law school. 4 11 The district court awarded Myrna
$12,720.44, and Lane appealed.4 12
Lane brought up three issues on appeal: (1) Lane asserted that
interpretation of judgments is a matter of law, and appellate review in the
present case should be de novo; (2) Lane argued that trial courts in
North Dakota only have jurisdiction to enforce a child's tuition arrange-
ment until the child reaches twenty-three years of age; and (3) Lane
asserted that he was only obligated to pay the equivalent of in-state
tuition costs for a public institution, not out-of-state or private institution
CoStS. 4 13
402. Anderson v. Anderson, 522 NW.2d 476,480 (N.D. 1994).
403. Id. at 477.
404. Id.
405. Id. The provision specifically states, in pertinent part, "[Lane] shall be responsible for
room, board, tuition and books for four years of college for each child .... [Lane's] responsibility for
the children's college expenses commences after the funds that the children now have and which will
continue to accumulate have been spent. If the children's savings do not take care of their college
education through the four years, [Lane] will be responsible to make up the difference." Id.
406. Id. at 477-78.





412. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d at 478.
413. Id.
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In addressing Lane's first argument, the court opined that an
appellate court may only clarify a trial court's judgment when that
judgment is vague, uncertain, or ambiguous.4 14 The term "four years,"
which is the term at issue in this case, was found by the court to be vague
and uncertain and in need of clarification. 415 However, where, as in this
case, the clarification has already been made by the same trial court that
ordered entry of the original divorce judgment, the trial court's clarifica-
tion must be given great deference. 4 16 Further, because the trial court
that ordered judgment in this case also clarified an ambiguity traditional-
ly defined as an issue of fact, the appropriate standard of review is to
determine whether the trial court's finding was "clearly erroneous." 4 17
Consequently, in reviewing the lower court's clarification of its original
finding of fact, the supreme court concluded that the decision was not
clearly erroneous.418
In addressing Lane's second argument, the enforceability of tuition
agreements, the supreme court found that although Lane interpreted
prior holdings correctly, his reading was too narrow. 419 Consequently,
the court declined to adopt hard and fast age limits for educational
support and chose to defer to the lower court's informed discretion to
decide such issues. 420
Finally, the supreme court addressed Lane's third argument that his
obligation only extends to the cost of attending law school at an in-state,
public institution such as the University of North Dakota. 421 Never
having addressed the issue directly, the North Dakota Supreme Court
referred to Pennsylvania's approach, which defers the determination of
the additional burden of bearing the expenses of a more expensive
institution to the trial court.422
This approach, which was adopted by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, recognizes the balance that must be struck in situations such as
this.423 The factors that a trial court must consider in balancing these
factors are:
what advantages are offered by the more expensive college in








421. Id. Ter Lynn was accepted to attend the University of North Dakota School of Law. Id.




child's anticipated vocation. It must then weigh these advan-
tages against the increased hardship that would be imposed on
the [parent] to determine whether the additional expense is
reasonable under the circumstances.424
Under this analysis, the supreme court deferred to the trial court's
finding that Lane did not specifically refuse to allow Teri Lynn to attend
an out-of-state law school, but that Lane did refuse to help her finance
her education. 425 Because Lane did not present any evidence that would
prove that he is unable to afford such a contribution, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.426
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
district court.427
Johnson v. Johnson
In Johnson v. Johnson 1428 Carlotta Johnson appealed from a district
court's decision vacating an order to show cause that her former spouse
should be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with their
divorce judgment. 429 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's decision, reasoning that a contempt proceeding is an appro-
priate means for enforcing provisions of a divorce decree. 430
Pursuant to the Johnson's divorce decree, Daryl Johnson stipulated
to pay each of his two children, Corey and Melissa, the sum of $300 per
month for a maximum of four years, if any child attended college and
maintained passing grades.4 31 Corey enrolled in college in 1990, and
initially Daryl complied with the stipulated payments.432 However, in
December of 1993, Daryl stopped making the payments and wrote to
Corey requesting that Corey contact him or he would no longer feel
obligated to make further payments.433 Carlotta immediately contacted
the Regional Child Support Enforcement Agency for assistance to
enforce the stipulation, but the agency refused to assist her because
Corey was not a minor.434 Carlotta then initiated a contempt proceeding
in district court, and the court issued an order to show cause to Daryl. 435
424. Id. at 479-80 (citing Commonwealth v. Larsen, 234 A.2d 18, 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)).
425. Id. at 480.
426. Id.
427. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d at 480.
428. 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1995).
429. Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 664 (N.D. 1995).
430. Id. at 668.
431. ld. at 665.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d at 665.
435. Id.
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After receiving the order, Daryl attempted to pay his arrearage of $900,
and actually mailed the $900 to Carlotta on behalf of Corey.436 Howev-
er, three days after Carlotta received the payment, the district court held a
show cause hearing.4 37 After the hearing, the district court vacated its
prior order to show cause, reasoning that the stipulated payments were
for "collateral support," and not "direct child support," and therefore
contempt proceedings were an inappropriate method of enforcement. 438
After determining that a district court order vacating an order to
show cause was appealable, 439 the North Dakota Supreme Court ad-
dressed the parties contentions.4 40 First, the court considered Daryl's
contention that the issue of whether he was obligated to pay the $300 was
moot because he purged himself of any possible contempt by paying the
arrearage.441 The court determined that a contempt action against a
parent for failing to pay child support would not be dismissed as moot,
even though the parent had paid arrearage in an effort to purge the
contempt, when the parent's refusal to pay support caused the other
parent to incur litigation costs, and when the situation could be repeat-
ed. 442 Thus, since Carlotta had incurred litigation costs as a result of
bringing the original contempt action, the court concluded that the issue
was not moot.443
Carlotta's primary contention on appeal was that the trial court
erred in concluding that contempt proceedings were not an appropriate
means of enforcing a support provision in a divorce decree. 444 In
considering this contention, the North Dakota'Supreme Court rejected
the trial court's treatment of the distinction between "collateral" sup-
port and "direct" support as being dispositive of the issue.445 Rather,
the court found that the ultimate issue was whether the Legislature intend-
ed to preclude parties to a divorce decree from using contempt proceed-
ings as a method of enforcing their child support stipulations. 446 The
court concluded that the Legislature did intend for contempt proceed-
436. Id. Daryl first attempted to pay the $900 to the clerk of district court, but the clerk refused
to accept the payment because it was not support for a minor child. Id. The next day, Daryl mailed
the $900 payment to Carlotta. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d at 665-66.
440. Id. at 666-68.
441. Id. at 666-67.
442. Id. at 667.
443. Id.
444. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d at 667.
445. Id. at 667-68.
446. Id. at 668.
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ings to be used in this manner because they provide an expedient
summary procedure for enforcing divorce judgments.447
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.448
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT
Gray v. Gray
In Gray v. Gray,449 Jackie Gray, appealed from a trial court order
denying her request for an increase in child support.4 50 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling, reasoning that a
former spouse's support to his second family is not a deductible hard-
ship adjustment for child support payments to his first family.451
Randy Gray, the appellant's former spouse, was paying $200 per
month in child support for his son Ryan Gray.4 52 According to Randy's
income and the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines, the level of
child support should have been $346 per month.453 However, Randy
testified that he would be unable to pay the higher level of support due
to his obligations to his new family. 454 The trial court granted Randy
relief from the statutory presumptive child support obligation, finding
that Randy's financial situation precluded any increase since at the lower
level, he was barely able to meet his necessary living expenses. 455 The
trial court based its decision on the grounds that the North Dakota Child
Support Guidelines did not take into account the basic needs of a family
supported by one parent who also owes support to another child, and
that the guidelines failed to consider the increased costs of travel and
general living expenses in a more urban state, i.e., California. 456
Upon review, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that support
of a second family is a factor considered under the child support guide-
lines, and therefore it is not deductible as a hardship adjustment. 457 The
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. 527 N.W.2d 268 (N.D. 1995).
450. Gray v. Gray, 527 N.W.2d 268, 269 (N.D. 1995). The child support was for Jackie's son
Ryan Gray. Id.
451. Id. at 270.
452. Id. at 269.
453. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-09.3 to -23 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (containing the child
support guidelines).
454. Gray, 527 N.W.2d at 269. Randy had remarried in California and had one child in that
marriage. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-09.3 to -23 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (containing the child
support guidelines).
457. Gray, 527 N.W.2d at 270.
88319951
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
court reasoned that "controllable living expenses of the obligor and his
household [do] not [constitute] hardships," thus the court found that the
trial court's reliance on these factors was erroneous. 458 The court also
took exception with the trial court's finding that the increased travel and
living expenses in an urban state such as California justified a hardship
adjustment. 459 After reviewing the record, the court found that there was
no evidence to support such a finding.460
Thus, the trial court's order was reversed and remanded for further
consideration .461
FAMILY LAW-MARITAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS
Crawford v. Crawford
In Crawford v. Crawford,462 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a motion to vacate an unconscionable divorce judgment was im-
properly denied, as its terms were so unfair that it should not have been
permitted to stand.463
Leslie and Kenneth Crawford were married in 1978 and, during
their marriage, had four children who were all minors at the time of the
divorce. 464 While they were married, Kenneth earned a medical degree
and finished his internship and residency while Leslie completed an
Associate of Arts degree in Criminal Justice and a Bachelor's degree in
Social Sciences. 465 In December of 1992, Kenneth accepted a job as a
physician with Pembina County Hospital in Cavalier and the family
moved from Grand Forks to Cavalier.466 Although the couple purchased
a home together in Cavalier, prior to moving, Kenneth told Leslie that he
wanted a divorce.467
Three months after moving to Cavalier, Kenneth filed for divorce
and moved out of the family home into an apartment, while Leslie and
the four children remained in the house. 468 A few months later, Kenneth
moved back into the home with the children and Leslie moved into





462. 524 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1994).
463. Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D. 1994).
464. Id. at 834.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 834.




Kenneth was based on Kenneth's representation that if he did not move
into the home, the bank would foreclose and the home as well as the
family vehicle would be lost.470 While Kenneth admitted to telling Leslie
these things, he failed to disclose to Leslie that he was financially con-
tributing greatly to his girlfriend and her children from a prior mar-
riage.471
After Kenneth filed for divorce, Leslie retained an attorney. 472
Leslie subsequently terminated her attorney's services and decided to
enter into a stipulated settlement of divorce. 473 Leslie explained that she
did this because she truly thought that the threats regarding the home
foreclosure were real and the only way to protect her children was to suc-
cumb to Kenneth's demands. 474
At the time of the divorce, Kenneth was earning approximately
$130,000 a year and Leslie was earning $300 per month.4 75 The trial
court entered judgment based on the stipulation, Kenneth was given
custody of the couple's four children, and Leslie was ordered to pay
child support in the amount of $15 per month.4 76 Kenneth was also
awarded the family home and assumed the mortgage on it.4 77 Personal
property was split between the parties. 478 As part of the stipulation,
Kenneth agreed to pay for Leslie's vehicle as well as $250 per month in
spousal support for six months plus Leslie's attorney fees. 479
Leslie did not appeal initially, however, five months later she re-
tained an attorney who filed a motion for relief from the judgment. 480
Leslie claimed that because she was coerced into signing the stipulation
and because she suffered from a brain tumor which rendered her unable
to fully understand the legal effect of the stipulation, the agreement was
unconscionable and should be set aside.481 The trial court denied her
motion and concluded that Leslie is an intelligent person who signed a
470. Id. In her affidavit, Leslie expressed concern that her children stay in a stable environment
and remain in the family home. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 834.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 835.
477. Id.
478. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835. Personal property is not at issue on this appeal. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. The motion was pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
481. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835.
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stipulation absent "fraud, deceit, coercion, or misrepresentation" by her
ex-husband.482 Leslie appealed the denial of her motion.4 83
In reviewing the trial court's decision denying a Rule 60(b) motion,
the North Dakota Supreme Court examined the record for abuse of
discretion. 484 After reviewing the record, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the trial court's decision to deny Leslie's motion was so
unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 485 In so holding, the court
reviewed the stipulation and found that it was unconscionable, one-sided,
and created undue hardship to Leslie.486
The court noted that although a trial court need not investigate the
terms of a stipulated agreement to determine whether or not is fair and
equitable, Rule 60(b)(vi) permits a trial court to avoid enforcement of a
stipulation that is blatantly one-sided and unfair as is the one in this
case. 487 Vacating an unconscionable divorce stipulation is a rare and
exceptional circumstance, the court stated, but it is the equivalent to
vacating an illegal agreement and must be done in certain appropriate
situations .488
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the
trial court to hear and consider evidence on the issues of spousal support
and child custody.489
Justice Neumann, joined by Justice Sandstrom, dissented stating that
while Leslie may have gotten the "very short end of [the] marital stick,"
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Leslie's Rule 60(b)
motion to set aside the judgment. 490 Justice Neumann further argued
that unless a court finds mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influ-
ence, the lower court's ruling may not be disturbed unless a de novo
review of the record is conducted. 49 1 The dissent asserted its concern
over the majority's failure to consider the proper standard of review,
prior law, and the trial court's basis for decision, stating that the majority
482. Id.
483. Id. at 834.
484. Id. at 835. N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The court noted that a trial court abuses its discretion by
acting in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 835.
485. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836.
486. Id. at 835. The court noted that the stipulation awarded Kenneth virtually all of his $130,000
salary as well as the couples four children, the family home, and his personal property. Id. The court
also noted that the children had been taken care of by Leslie throughout Kenneth's education and
throughout her brain tumor. Id.
487. Id. at 836. N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(vi).
488. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 837 (Neumann, J., dissenting). N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
491. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d at 836-37.
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overstepped its power in relieving Leslie of the consequences of her
hasty decisions.492
JUVENILE LAW -TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In Re D.R.
In In Re D.R.,493 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that long-
term foster care was not a reasonable alternative to termination of
parental rights.494
Susan and George (both pseudonyms) had two children, Doug and
Bill (also pseudonyms). 495 Doug was born on May 31, 1987, and Bill
was born on December 28, 1988.496 On April 15, 1991, Doug and Bill
were declared deprived children by the juvenile court and were subse-
quently removed from the home and placed with Stark County Social
Services. 497 Their care, custody, and control has remained with Stark
County Social services since that date.498
On February 1, 1994, Stark County Social Services petitioned the
court to terminate the parental rights of both Susan and George. 499 In
granting the petition, the trial court concluded that Doug and Bill were
currently deprived children and that unless parental rights were terminat-
ed, this deprivation was likely to continue, prolonging the suffering
currently being endured by both children. 500
In terminating Susan and George's parental rights, the trial court
ordered that the court retain custody and control of both children
through Stark County Social Services. 501 The court ordered that Stark
492. Id. at 837.
493. 525 N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 1994).
494. In Re D.R., 525 N.W.2d 672,675 (N.D. 1994).




499. In Re D.R., 525 N.W.2d at 673.
500. Id. After hearing testimony from a variety of witnesses, the trial court concluded that
George, who has physically abused the children, suffers from schizophrenia and has failed to continue
his monitoring appointments with his doctor. Id. The trial court also found that Susan has borderline
intellectual functioning and cannot control or manage multiple tasks, including more than one child at a
time. Id. The trial court also found that Susan contributed to the neglect of her children by remaining
indifferent to the physical abuse being administered by George. Id. As for the children, the trial court
heard testimony to the fact that Doug suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from prior
abuse and neglect by his parents. Id. As well, Doug displays disruptive behavior following visits with
either or both of his parents. Id. Bill, the younger of the two children, displays delayed development
in a variety of coping and living skills and is currently taking prescribed anti-seizure medications for
his demonstrated rage and anger episodes. Id.
501. Id. at 673.
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County Social Services diligently seek to place both children with
adoptive families. 502 From this order, Susan appealed. 503
On appeal, Susan did not dispute any factual findings. 504 Instead,
Susan requested that the children be placed in permanent foster care in
lieu of parental termination so as to allow her parental visitation. 505 In
rejecting Susan's request, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that, in
this case, foster care was not a reasonable alternative to the termination of
parental rights.506
Susan argued that section 27-20-36(4)(d) of the North Dakota
Century Code gives the trial court discretion as to whether the children
should remain permanently in foster care without terminating her
parental rights. 507 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with that
proposition but added that this type of discretion is circumscribed by the
fact that a trial court can abuse its discretion by denying the adoption
when evidence suggests that the denial would seriously affect a child's
emotional well being.508 In this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court
agreed with the findings of the trial court and held that long-term foster
care would not be in the best interests of either Doug or Bill.509
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order and held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Susan's parental
rights .510
502. Id.
503. Id. at 672-73.
504. In Re D.R., 525 N.W.2d at 673. To terminate parental rights, the court stated, the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence the requisite conditions set forth in section 27-20-44(1) of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1) (1991). Susan did not contest that
these conditions were clearly met and proven. In Re D.R., 525 N.W.2d at 673.
505. In Re D.R.. 525 N.W.2d at 673.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 673-74. Section 27-20-36(4)(d) states:
The extension [of an order of disposition may be made if it] does not exceed eighteen
months from the expiration of an order limited by subsection 3 or two years from the
expiration of any other limited order. However, the court may order that the child
permanently remain in foster care with a specified caregiver and that the duration of the
order be left to the determination of the court if the court determines that:
(3) With respect to a child under the age of ten, termination of parental rights and
subsequent adoption would not be in the best interests of the child[.]...
N. D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-36 (1991).
508. In Re D.R., 525 N.W.2d at 674, (referring to Justice VandeWalle's concurrence in In Re
K.S.H., 442 N.W.2d 417 (N.D. 1989).
509. In Re D. R., 525 N.W.2d at 674-75. The court credited testimony to the fact that both boys
suffer from developmental and emotional problems arising from their past abuse and neglect. Id. at
674. The trial court found that both boys need a stable and permanent atmosphere away from their
biological parents in order for them to address their difficulties. Id. at 674-75.




Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co.
In Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co.,511 the North Dakota Su-
preme Court found that vicarious liability of an operator for the inde-
pendent contractor's negligence did not extend to the employee of an
independent contractor. 512 Further, the court held that when an operator
does not retain enough control over the work performed by an indepen-
dent contractor's employee, there is no duty to exercise retained control
with reasonable care.513
In 1984, ANG, a coal gasification plant operator, hired Ceramic
Cooling Tower Company (CCT), an independent contractor, to replace
tiles in the water cooling towers at ANG's plant in Beulah, North Dako-
ta.514 Melvin Fleck was an employee of CCT, whose job was to replace
the existing plastic tiles from the water cooling towers. 515 Because of the
unclean working conditions inherent in such a job, CCT's employees
were provided protective wear. 516 Although Fleck was issued such
protective wear and had a history of asthma, he elected not to wear his
face mask. 517
On July 30, 1984, Fleck collapsed while working in the towers. 518
Upon reviewing medical attention, Fleck was diagnosed with asthma,
rhinitis, and bronchitis, and was given prescriptive medication with an
instruction to return in two months for a check-up.51 9 Fleck did not
return for the follow-up visit, and subsequently applied for and received
benefits under workers compensation for the July incident. 520
Approximately six years later, Fleck filed suit against ANG, alleging
that he had developed occupational asthma as a result of his exposure to
hazardous chemicals while working in ANG's towers.521 ANG moved
for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court. 522 Upon
511. 522 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1994).
512. Fleck v. ANG Coal Gasification Co., 522 N.W.2d 445,454 (N.D. 1994).
513. Id. at 448-49.
514. Id. at 446-47.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 447. The protective wear included face masks, rubber slickers, boots, and gloves. Id.





522. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 447. ANG asserted that "it had no duty to provide for Fleck's safety
on the job, that there were no hazardous substances present in the towers, and that Fleck's injuries
were not caused by any exposure while working at the plant." Id. The trial court agreed. Id.
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dismissing Fleck's action, the trial court also awarded costs to ANG.523
Fleck appealed.524
On appeal are three issues: the first referring to retained control, the
second involving inherent danger and peculiar risk, and the third ad-
dressing recovery costs. 525 In addressing the first issue, the court referr-
ed to Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which states that
"one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for the acts or
omissions of the independent contractor" unless the employer retains
control over the work.526 Further, Section 414 protects the employees of
an independent contractor when the employer exercises retained control
over the work. 527 However, the court noted, Section 414 liability is only
enforced when the employer retains the "right to control the method,
manner, and operative detail of the work," which does not include the
mere right to inspect or make suggestions. 528
Fleck did not argue that ANG retained control through an express
provision of the employment contract, nor did Fleck argue that anybody
but CCT had full control over the manner and method of work perfor-
mance.529 However, Fleck did argue that ANG exercised enough actual
control over the work to create a duty under Section 414.530 Specifical-
ly, Fleck asserted that: (1) ANG provided the protective gear to CCT
employees, (2) ANG periodically tested the air in the cooling towers to
ensure sufficient oxygen, and (3) an ANG employee periodically viewed
the work being performed by CCT in the towers.531
The North Dakota Supreme Court, even when viewing the assertions
by Fleck as truthful, could not find enough evidence that would give rise
to a duty under Section 414.532 Furthermore, the supreme court found
that Fleck failed to prove that ANG required the protective wear to be
523. Id.
524. Id. at 446.
525. Id. at 447. The court phrased the issues as follows:
I. Did ANG retain sufficient control over the work to create a duty to exercise that
control with reasonable care under Section 414, Restatement (Second) of Torts?
II. Do the rules imposing vicarious liability upon one who hires an independent
contractor to perform inherently dangerous work, or work involving peculiar risk,
provide protection to employees of the independent contractor?
III. Is a party who prevails on summary judgment entitled to recover costs and
disbursements?
Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965) (creating liability for the employers if they
retain control over the independent contractor's employees).
526. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 447.
527. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
528. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 448. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
529. Id. at 448.
530. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
531. Fleck. 522 N.W.2d at 448-49.
532. Id. at 447. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
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worn by CCT's workers, that ANG's conduct could only be viewed as
suggestive at best, and that ANG did not, in any way, supervise or control
any of CCT's work. 533 Therefore, because no duty arose on behalf of
ANG, summary judgment was appropriate. 534
On the second issue, Fleck asserted that because CCT performed
work that was inherently dangerous and involved peculiar risks, ANG
must be held vicariously liable for CCT's conduct. 535 Fleck referred to
Sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which
provide for exceptions to the rule of employer non-liability for acts
performed by an independent contractor. 536 In rejecting this argument,
the supreme court reviewed analysis in other jurisdictions, including the
majority of jurisdictions which hold that "employers of independent
contractors are not vicariously liable to the employees of the indepen-
dent contractor under Sections 416 and 427."537 The underlying policy
issues discussed by the court included the concern with providing a
remedy for injured "others," such remedy already having been satisfied
through the benefits of workers compensation. 538 The court noted that
the employee already has a remedy in workers compensation, which has
already been indirectly paid by the employer of the independent con-
tractor through premiums.539
As well, the court espoused policy concerns in having an indepen-
dent contractor's employer subjected to greater liability in hiring an
independent contractor versus hiring their own employees, who may
have less experience with certain dangerous work. 540 The court empha-
sizes that under the minority view, an employer would be penalized for
hiring experienced independent contractors to perform the dangerous
work and would, in turn, encourage employers to hire their own, un-
skilled, untrained, employees. 54 1 Finally, the court noted that when
looking to the intent of the North Dakota Legislature, the Workers'
Compensation Act serves as a final settlement of claims by injured
workers and their employers. 542
533. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 448-49.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 449.
536. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416,427 (1965).
537. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 450. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416,427 (1965).
538. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 451. The court noted that the reference to "others" in Sections 416
and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not include the employees of the contractor. Id. at
449-50 n.2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416,427 (1965).
539. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 451.
540. Id. at 452.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 453. The court also noted the possible effect of double recovery for the independent
contractor's conduct if a court were to hold that the underlying negligent conduct on the part of the
independent contractor was "released" by statute. Id. at 454.
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In adopting the majority view, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that "an employer of an independent contractor is not vicariously
liable to the independent contractor's employees under Sections 416
and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."543
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
district court.5 44
TORTS- NEGLIGENCE
Champagne v. United States
In Champagne v. United States,545 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that North Dakota's comparative fault statute should be used
in determining the fault of a victim who committed suicide after being
discharged from a mental health hospital where he was treated and
released for a previous suicide attempt. 546 The court also held that fault
on the victim's behalf was attributable to his parents who were acting as
personal representatives of their son's estate. 547
On January 25, 1989, Ricky Champagne attempted to commit
suicide by taking an overdose of medication. 548 Subsequently, Ricky
was admitted to the Indian Health Services (IHS) Hospital in Belcourt,
North Dakota, where he was treated and stabilized by Dr. Blain.549 Dr.
Blain then ordered that someone from the mental health unit meet with
Ricky immediately for a mental health interview. 550 The interview was
conducted, but not until the next day when Lance Azure, a social service
representative, met with Ricky for approximately two hours. 551 Accord-
ing to the history obtained during the interview, experts testified that
Ricky had been suffering from an "adolescent adjustment disorder with
suicidal ideations." 552 Based on the ongoing conflict between Ricky
543. Id. at 454. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416,427 (1965). In addressing Fleck's last
claim, the awarding of costs and disbursements, the court held that the district court was correct in
awarding costs and disbursements to ANG. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 455. Fleck asserted that Section
28-26-06 of the North Dakota Century Code only allows recovery of disbursements when there has
actually been a trial, and therefore the district court erred in awarding disbursement costs to ANG
upon dismissal by summary judgment. Id. at 454. After analyzing legislative intent, the court respond-
ed by construing Section 28-26-06(2) to apply if the deposition is actually used at trial, or if the
deposition was only intended to be used at trial, regardless of whether a trial was held. Id. at 455.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-06(2) (1991).
544. Fleck, 522 N.W.2d at 455.
545. 513 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1994).
546. Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 79 (N.D. 1994).
547. Id. at 81-82.
548. Id. at 77.
549. Id.
550. Id.




and his father that continuously troubled Ricky, experts could not rule
out major depression as part of their diagnosis.553
Two days after Ricky's initial arrival at IHS, Dr. Blain ordered
Ricky's discharge with the approval of the Mental Health Unit. 554 Mr.
Azure approved the discharge on the condition that Ricky return the
next day to meet with Mr. Azure. 555 When Ricky and his mother re-
turned, Mr. Azure could not be located. 556 IHS did not schedule or
provide further counseling with Ricky, nor did it refer Ricky for evalua-
tion by a psychiatrist or psychologist. 557
When Ricky returned home, tension between he and his father
remained static, and Ricky's suicide attempt was never discussed. 558 No
counseling whatsoever was provided for Ricky or his family. 559 On
February 13, 1989, Ricky's mother, Debra, visited with Mr. Azure and
expressed her concerns about her son's recent behavior, including
quitting school, moving away from home, and giving away his prized
possessions. 560 Mr. Azure assured Debra that she need not worry
because Ricky, who was eighteen years old, was old enough to take care
of himself and make his own decisions. 561
After the discussion with Debra, Mr. Azure did try to contact Ricky,
but was unsuccessful. 562 On February 16, 1989, Ricky contacted Azure
and made an appointment for counseling the next day. 563 Ricky never
made it to the appointment, and Mr. Azure took no further action to
contact Ricky. 564 Three days later, Ricky shot himself.565
Ricky's parents, Richard and Debra Champagne, subsequently
brought a medical malpractice/wrongful death action against the United
States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that employees
of IHS were negligent in caring for Ricky following his suicide attempt
on January 25, 1989, and that the negligence was a proximate cause of
his later suicide on February 20, 1989.566 The federal district court for








560. Id. These behaviors are very typical for people who are contemplating suicide. Id.
561. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 77.
562. Id. Mr. Azure left a message with Ricky's grandmother, with whom Ricky was staying. Id.
563. Id. at 77-78.
564. Id. at 78. Up until this time, Ricky had not received any counseling or treatment since his
initial discharge from IHS on January 28, 1989. Id.
565. Id.
566. Champagne. 513 N.W.2d at 77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1988).
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was the primary proximate cause of his death, and since that conduct was
attributable to the representatives of his estate, recovery was barred .567
Pursuant to the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions to the North
Dakota Supreme Court.568 The first issue presented was "how a pa-
tient's act of suicide should be compared with the fault of a medical
provider who, knowing about the patient's propensity to commit suicide,
failed to provide reasonable medical care." 569  The second question was
whether a "decedent's fault is attributed to the persons suing an alleged
tortfeasor for the wrongful death of the decedent." 570  The North
Dakota Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. 571
In holding that a victim's suicide could be considered under
comparative fault, the court first analyzed North Dakota's comparative
fault statute, which establishes that fault includes an intentional act.572
And although suicide is an intentional act, the court noted that a suicidal
patient will often suffer from a mental illness that furthers the diminish-
ment of the patient's ability to protect himself.573 The court then
analyzed North Dakota's statute defining a "[m]entally ill person" and
applied it to comparative fault analysis. 574 In doing so, the court rea-
soned that a "mentally ill patient often retains some capacity to protect
himself from harm, even though diminished." 575 It is one's mental
diminishment that the court ultimately focuses on when comparing fault
between a suicide victim and a medical provider who undertakes the duty
to act "reasonably under the circumstances of each case." 576
The Champagnes argued that when a patient's intentional act of
suicide is a foreseeable result of the failure of a medical provider to
567. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 78. See Champagne v. U.S.. 836 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.D. 1992).
568. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 76. N.D. R. APP. P. 47.
569. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 78. The first certified question specifically states:
I. Is a suicide victim's fault to be considered under North Dakota's Comparative fault
Statutes, § 32-03.2-01 and 02[.]
Id. at 76. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01, -02 (Supp. 1993) (containing the comparative fault
statute).
570. Champagne. 513 N.W.2d at 81. The second certified question specifically states:
2. Is any fault of the suicide victim attributable to the plaintiffs Debra Champagne and
Richard Champagne who are the parents and surviving heirs of the suicide victim and
institute this action as personal representative of the estate of their deceased son.
Id. at 76.
571. Id. at 76-77.
572. Id. at 79. The specific statute that the supreme court reviewed was North Dakota Century
Code Chapter 32-03.2-02, which was enacted by the Legislature in 1987, and specifically states that
"[ulnder this section, fault includes negligence[.]" N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993).
573. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 79.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 79-80.
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reasonably treat and prevent the suicide, comparative fault of the suicide
victim is never appropriate.5 77 In rejecting this argument, the court
stated that if a patient is capable of reasonably caring for himself,
allocation of fault is appropriate. 578 However, the court conceded, in
cases where a patient's capacity to care for himself is totally diminished
as a result of the mental illness, allocation of fault is not appropriate. 579
Ultimately, comparative fault determination in North Dakota turns on the
"factual extent of a patient's diminished mental capacity," such capaci-
ty to be determined by the trier of fact. 580  Furthermore, when a pa-
tient's suicide is a foreseeable consequence of negligent care by a
medical provider, the suicide cannot be considered a superseding inter-
vening cause, a cause which must be found to be both independent and
unforeseeable .581
When answering the second certified question of fault attribution,
the court applied the analysis used in its previous holdings that have
upheld judgments that attributed the fault of the decedent to wrongful
death plaintiffs. 582 In advancing that analogy, the court reiterated its
policy for such a holding, which is to give the same effect to plaintiff
representatives as that of an actual plaintiff.583 Specifically, the effect of
reducing damages according to fault. 584 Accordingly, the court rejected
the Chamgagne's argument because § 32-03.2-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code does not expressly refer to the decedent's "legal repre-
sentative," a decedent's fault cannot be imputed to the wrongful death
plaintiffs.5 85 The court's basis for this rejection was that construing §
32-21-01 together with § 32-03.2-02 produces the unambiguous result
577. Id. at 80.
578. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 80.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 80-81. In practical terms, "the worse the suicidal patient's diminished capacity, the
greater the medical provider's responsibility." Id. at 81. North Dakota's comparative fault statute,
however, bars recovery when the "contributory fault is as great as the combined fault of all other
persons who contributed to the injury." Id. NORTH DAKOTA CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993).
581. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81. Since there was no finding by the district court on Ricky's
incapacity, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that if Ricky's suicide was a "reasonably
foreseeable consequence of IHS's failure to provide reasonable medical care, then Ricky's suicide
cannot be a superseding cause that entirely absolves IHS from responsibility by breaking the legal




585. Id. at 81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993).
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that a "decedent's fault is 'attributable to the wrongful death plaintiffs,
and damages are diminished in proportion to the contributing fault of
both the plaintiffs, if any, and the decedent." 586
The questions certified by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals were
answered.
586. Champagne, 513 N.W.2d at 81-82. ND. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-02, 32-21-01 (Supp. 1993).
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